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In light of the growing urgency for action on climate change and the 
stagnation of negotiations within the climate change regime, the study 
closely examines the content, legal status and operation of principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, which is assumed to be one of 
the biggest stumbling blocks in achieving an effective climate change treaty 
system. The study also analyses the link between the principle and the 
notions of evolution of the treaty system and graduation of developing 
countries that have reached an advanced stage of development, and 
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1 Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Multi-lateral negotiations within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have reached an impasse. The 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, which took place in Copenhagen, 
Denmark from 7 – 19 December 2009,1 marked the culmination of a two-
year negotiating process aimed at adopting an agreement for reducing global 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and avoiding catastrophic climate change.2 
Unfortunately, intense negotiations failed to deliver what many hoped would 
lead to a sustainable future for the planet and its six billion citizens. Most of 
the items on the agenda for the negotiations were not agreed and instead 
parties decided to ‘take note’ of the Copenhagen Accord – a weak political 
agreement that was negotiated amongst a group of 29 countries and which 
was not based on the two year negotiation process.3
                                                          
1 The conference included the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 15), the 5th Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP 5) to the Kyoto Protocol, the 31st 
session of the Subsidiary Body on Technological Advice (SBSTA 31), the 31st session of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI 31), the tenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 10) and the eighth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC (AWG-LCA 8). 
 
2 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin: Summary of the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December.’ Available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf [ Accessed 11 January 2010] 
3 Ibid. There were two texts being negotiated, one each from the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA. The Copenhagen 
Accord has been analysed in detail elsewhere but it is important to note that it was negotiated by a small 
group of countries, was neither authorised by the COP nor was the COP kept abreast of is development. See 
for example: Emmanuel Guerin and Matthieu Wemaere ‘The Copenhagen Accord: What happened: Is it a good 
deal? Who wins and who loses? What is next?’ Available at 
http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-
debat/Id_082009_guerin_wemaere_accord_copenhague.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2010]; IISD ‘A brief analysis 
of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.’  Available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/enb_copenhagen_commentary.pdf  [Accessed 11 January 2010] ; John 
Drexhage and Deborah Murphy ‘Copenhagen: A memorable time for all the wrong reasons?’ Available at 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1218 [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Although some authors are 













Issues that proved controversial during the negotiations included 
mitigation (in particular the magnitude of GHG emissions commitments for 
developed countries and the participation of more advanced developing 
countries in mitigation actions), finance, the legal structure of the outcome 
of the negotiations and the future of the Kyoto Protocol.4 Most of these 
issues have been contentious since the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, with 
no solution in sight and5 many of the country positions remained 
entrenched throughout the whole two-year process with high levels of 
mistrust between developed and developing countries.6
Much of the controversy between developed and developing countries 
can be traced to one of the founding principles of the UNFCCC, namely, the 




 Unless the 
issues surrounding the interpretation and implementation of the CDR 
principle are resolved, the deadlock in the UNFCCC negotiations may 
continue unabated for some time to come 
1.2 Background to the study 
The UNFCCC was adopted in response to human induced global 
warming and the resulting change in the earth’s climate. It was opened for 
signature in June 1992, entered into force on 21 March 19948
                                                          
4 IISD (note 2) at 6 
 and has been 
ratified by 194 countries. The stated objective of the convention is the 
5 See for example, Farhana Yamin ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment and Future Challenges.’ (1998)7 2 
RECIEL 113  
6 IISD (note 2) at 8 
7 See generally: Lavanya Rajamani The principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the balance of 
commitments under the climate regime’ (2000) 9 (2) RECIEL 120 
8 UNFCCC ‘Status of ratification’ available at 













... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 9
The convention defines climate change as any alteration of the climate 
system which is a direct or indirect result of human activity and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability.
 
10
The main principles of the convention are equity, sustainable 
development, the precautionary principle, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities
 
11 and by implication, the polluter pays 
principle.12 The CDR principle, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2, plays a significant role in the convention and in the negotiations arising 
from it.13
The first formulation of the CDR principle as we know it was contained 
in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
which reads: 
  
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of 
the technologies and financial resources they command.14
                                                          
9 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 (1995) 34 ILM 1671 (UNFCCC) Article 2 
 
10 Article 1 
11 Article 3 
12 Lal Kurukulasuriya and Nicholas Robinson Training Manual on International Environmental Law (2003) 32 
13 It is mentioned in Article 3 ‘Principles’ and in the chapeau to Article 4 which contains substantive provisions  












The principle is also contained in Article 3 of the UNFCCC which reads: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.15
The main obligations of the Convention are contained in Articles 4 and 
12 and include the development of national inventories of GHG emissions 
and sinks, the promotion of scientific and technical cooperation, and the 
sustainable management of forests, oceans and ecosystems.
 
16 Although all 
Parties to the Convention are required to develop national programmes for 
mitigation against the causes of, and adaptation to climate change, reliance 
on the CDR principle in the convention resulted in emissions reduction 
commitments for developed countries only, and according to historical 
responsibility and economic status of each Party.17 Developing countries on 
the other hand are not required to take on emissions reduction 
commitments although they can do so on a voluntary basis.18
In recognition of the fact that more stringent targets were required to 
meet the objective of climate stabilisation,
  
19 the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 
February 200520
                                                          
15 Note the difference in the formulation between Principle 7 and the Article 3 of the UNFCCC. This difference 
and its implications are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
. It has been ratified by 184 Parties to the UNFCCC. While 
the convention only encourages developed countries to stabilise GHG 
emissions, the Kyoto Protocol commits them to binding emissions reduction 
16 These obligations will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.8.2 
17 These are set out in Annex 1 to the convention 
18 Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) at 115 
19 Ibid  













targets. The distinction between developed and developing countries was 
carried over from the UNFCCC into the Kyoto Protocol where developing 
countries were not required to undertake any emissions reduction 
commitments. 21
Given that developing countries are not a homogenous group
 
22 and that 
the climate change problem is urgent and requires the participation of more 
than just the industrialised countries, there may come a point where larger 
developing countries with high and growing emissions23 are required to take 
on emissions reduction commitments. This issue of ‘evolution and 
graduation’ is contentious and if not treated with care could lead to 
developing countries being saddled with onerous burdens that run counter 
to the equity and CDR principles.24 If handled correctly it could lead to the 
fair distribution of commitments that can lead to the level of emissions 
reduction that are required by science.25
 
  
                                                          
21  Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) at 115 
22 Sumudu Atapattu Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (2006) 379 at 381; The coalition 
that represents the developing countries at UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations is known as the G77 and 
China. This is a very diverse group with over 130 member countries including oil producing countries, small 
island states and some very wealthy countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Israel. See also Joyeeta 
Gupta and Angela Churie Kallhauge ‘Coalition building’  (2002) 44/ 45  Tiempo Available at 
http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/portal/archive/issue4445/t4445a6.htm [Accessed: 5 August 2009] 
23 Singapore, South Korea, Qatar, Israel, Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa are some of the biggest of 
these 
24 Harald Winkler and Shaun Vorster ‘Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali’ (2007) 7 Climate 
Policy  240 at 246  Available at: http://www.eri.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/07Winkler-Vorster.pdf 













1.3 Problem statement 
1.3.1 State of the Atmosphere  
It is widely acknowledged that climate change is inevitable and that in 
some regions its effects are starting to be felt. The Fourth Assessment 
Report (FAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
states unequivocally that warming of the climate system is taking place and 
that most of the warming is due to human activities.26 In fact it states that 
eleven of the twelve warmest years since 1850 have occurred in the period 
1995 to 2006.27
The FAR predicts that average global temperatures will increase from 
between 1.1
  
oC to 2.9oC (lower end of the predictions) and 2.4oC to 6.4oC 
(higher end of the projections). Average global temperatures are expected to 
increase by 0.1o
1.3.2 State of the post-2012 negotiations 
C over the next two decades, even with a stabilisation of 
GHG concentrations at year 2000 levels. In addition to this the FAR predicts 
that these temperature increases will be accompanied by an average global 
sea level rise of over half a metre and increases in warm spells, heat waves 
and heavy rainfall events. Increases in the intensity of tropical cyclones, 
increases in the occurrence of droughts and the melting of polar ice caps are 
also predicted. The science, therefore, clearly demands that a comprehensive 
climate protection regime is concluded in the shortest possible time. 
For the past two years, Parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
have been negotiating an emissions reduction regime for the period 2013 – 
2017.28
                                                          
26 IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at 3 
 The current emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
27 Ibid 
28 These negotiations were mandated by the Parties at COP 13 that was held in Bali, Indonesia in 2007. The Bali 
Action Plan as adopted by the Parties, established the AWG-LCA (see note 1 above) and agreed on a two track 
negotiation process which included the AWG-KP (which was established at COP 11 in 2005). The AWG-LCA was 












Protocol will expire in December 2012. Negotiations are taking place within 
the UNFCCC, under the auspices of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), and within the Kyoto Protocol under 
the auspices of the Ad-Hoc Working Group-Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), in 
order to cater for those developed countries that are not Parties to Kyoto. 
Thus there are two sets of negotiations: ‘convention track negotiations’ or 
LCA negotiations (under the AWG-LCA), and ‘protocol track negotiations’ 
known as post-Kyoto negotiations (under the AWG-KP). However, 
negotiations have reached an impasse of sorts which threatens to 
undermine the effectiveness of the climate protection regime.  
Developed country concerns 
Developed countries, with the bulk of the responsibility for climate 
change, are demanding that the more advanced developing countries should 
take on emissions reduction commitments.29 The basis of their argument is 
that developing country emissions continue to grow and will soon outpace 
those of developed countries and therefore any meaningful response to 
climate change will have to include the US and major developing 
countries.30
Developed countries are also demanding that the convention and the 
protocol should include a mechanism for evolution and graduation based 
mainly on levels of emissions and wealth.
 
31
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The AWG-KP was mandated to negotiate further commitments for developed countries following the end of 
the current commitment period. The deadline for the negotiations was supposed to be December 2009 in 
Copenhagen. No agreement was reached in Copenhagen and so the negotiating mandate of the two working 
groups has been extended to December 2010 when 16th COP of the UNFCCC and the 6th MOP of the Kyoto 
Protocol will be held in Cancun, Mexico. See IISD (note 2) at 2  
 This, they argue, would ensure 
that all high emitters take on reduction commitments.  
29 IISD (note 3) at 1 
30 Ibid  
31 Rajamani (note 7) at; IISD (note 3) at 2; Lavanya Rajamani ‘Differentiation in the post-2012 climate regime’ 












Furthermore, it is important to note that developed countries are not a 
homogeneous group with the former communist countries in Eastern 
Europe exhibiting economic indicators that are similar to those of most 
developing countries, and their GHG emissions have dropped drastically 
since the UNFCCC was adopted. The negotiations within the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol have to take cognisance of this. 
Developing country concerns 
Developing countries, on the other hand (some of which are becoming 
serious polluters in their own right), are demanding that developed 
countries fulfil their original obligations under the Kyoto Protocol32 and take 
on the whole burden of reducing emissions since they are historically 
responsible for current global emissions. Developing countries also argue 
that emissions reduction commitments would jeopardise their 
developmental programmes.  Moreover, developing countries are against all 
talk of evolution and graduation, particularly the form proposed by 
developed countries.33 Finally developing countries are wary of accepting 
any emissions reduction commitments that are not accompanied by 
financial, technological and capacity assistance.34
1.3.3 Deadlock 
 
In 2009, the UNFCCC Secretariat outlined the key deliverables for the 
negotiations in Copenhagen as: ambitious emission reduction commitments 
for developed countries, mitigation actions for large developing countries, 
finance and an agreement on the architecture of the post-2012 regime.35
                                                          
32 Instead of reducing emissions, most developed country Parties have seen their emissions growing and it is 
unlikely that their Kyoto targets will be met. See for example the South-North Development Monitor SUNS, 
No. 6378, 3 December 2007 
 
33 Rajamani (note 31) at 49 
34 Ibid  












Negotiations under the AWG-KP made little progress during 2009 with 
developing countries calling on developed countries to commit to deep 
emissions cuts and developed countries urging the USA and major 
developing countries to share the burden of emissions reductions.36 Under 
the AWG-LCA negotiations progressed well on issues such as adaptation, 
deforestation and technology transfer but stalled on issues of mitigation, 
finance and the future of the Kyoto Protocol.37
There is a deep divide between developed and developing countries
 
38 
with both sides using the CDR principle to justify their positions.39 
Developed countries claim that the principle requires that all countries take 
on emissions reduction commitments although these may differ according to 
national circumstances. They also claim that the principle does not require 
them to transfer finance or technology to developing countries. Developing 
countries, on the other hand, claim that the principle absolves them totally 
from any emissions reduction commitments, and that CDR requires they be 
provided with funding.40
This lack of clarity on what the principle really requires has contributed 
to the lack of progress in the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP negotiations. Instead, 
the principle is used as a shield that enables the two groups to evade any 
serious emissions reduction commitments,
  
41
                                                          
36 Ibid; IISD (note 2) at 2 
 and in the meanwhile climate 
change continues unabated. 
37 Ibid 
38 Rajamani (note 7) 
39 Rajamani (note 7) at ;  Lavanya Rajamani ‘Addressing the post-Kyoto stress disorder: Reflections of the 
emerging legal architecture of the climate regime’ Available at 
http://www.cprindia.org/moreworkingpapers.php?s=150 [Accessed 11 January 2010] 
40 Rajamani (note 7) 
41 Rajamani (note 7); Susan Biniaz ‘Common but differentiated responsibility’ (2002) 96 American Society for 













1.4 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of the study is to analyse the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and develop an understanding of its 
operation, in other treaties and in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (Chapter 
2). This will include a determination of whether the use of the principle in 
the climate regime absolves developing countries from taking on binding 
emissions reduction commitments.  
The study also aims to analyse whether the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities encompasses the notions of evolution and 
graduation. This will include an examination of the concepts of evolution 
and graduation and their implications for developing country Parties (see 
Chapter 3). The study will investigate what forms of evolution and 
graduation would be fair and equitable and how they can be implemented if 
at all (Chapter 4). 
 
1.5 Rationale for the study 
Due to the scale of global warming, there is an urgent need to conclude 
AWG-LCA and AWG-KP negotiations with emissions reduction commitments 
that are at the level required by science. The problem is so large that 
emissions reduction by developed countries alone will not suffice.42 Some 
action will be required by, at least, the more advanced developing countries. 
Since the positions taken up by developed and developing countries have 
become polarised with each side claiming the CDR principle to bolster their 
positions, there is a need for the re-evaluation of simple developed – 
developing country divide that has been used to date.43
                                                          
42 P Baer et al The greenhouse development rights framework : The right to development in a climate 
constrained world 2ed (2008)  
 Countries like Israel, 













Singapore, South Korea, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa 
cannot be placed in the same category as poor countries like Malawi, 
Guatemala and Bangladesh.44
Furthermore, COP 15 witnessed the emergence of a new alliance in the 
climate change negotiations. The Presidents of Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa met just before the conference to form an alliance called the 
BASIC Group which was instrumental in brokering a deal with the US over 
the Copenhagen Accord. It can be inferred that this group was formed to 
protect the economic interests of these countries which are some of the more 
advanced economically and are the biggest polluters amongst developing 
countries. The emergence of this group signals an acknowledgement by 
these countries that they are different from other developed countries and 
that they have a responsibility to contribute to the mitigation of climate 
change. 
  
On the other hand, it would not be fair or equitable to require those 
countries that are not responsible for current global warming to take on the 
same emissions reduction commitments as countries that have benefited 
hugely from their polluting activities. There is a need to define a concept of 
the CDR principle that can be used as a bridge between the developed and 
developing countries and move the negotiations forward, thereby 
contributing to the protection of the climate system.  
This study will therefore contribute to:  
• A better understanding of the CDR principle and its operation.  
• A better understanding of the concepts of evolution and graduation 
• A better understanding of the relationship between CDR and the 
concepts of evolution and graduation 
• The development of key elements that any models of evolution and 
graduation should take into consideration. This would ensure that 













any models proposed would meet the need for urgent action but also 
takes into consideration of the development needs of the large 
developing countries. 
 
1.6 Research methodology  
The methodology used in this study was qualitative in nature and was 
based on documentary research on international environmental law, the 
principles of environmental law, the CDR principle and the concepts of 
evolution and graduation. Primary sources of data included various sources 
of hard law such as treaties, judicial decisions and state practice; and soft 
law such as declarations and agreements. 
Secondary sources of data included the writings of authorities on 
various topics. Examples of these include text books, journals and internet 
materials from reputable websites.  
In addition to the above, the author has used the experience and 
insights gained from attending the last three climate change conferences 
namely:  the UNFCCC COP 13 and Kyoto MOP3 that were held in Bali, 
Indonesia in 2007; the UNFCCC COP 14 and Kyoto MOP 4 that were held in 
Poznan, Poland in 2008; and the UNFCCC COP 15 and Kyoto MOP 5 that 
were held in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009. These insights have informed 
much of the discussion and analysis contained in the study. 
 
1.7 Overview of the report 
The study is arranged in five chapters. The first chapter provides 
essential background information. It provides the statement of the problem, 













The second chapter analyses the CDR principle. It investigates the 
history of the principle and explores its legal status. The chapter also 
analyses the different forms of differentiation and goes on to discuss the use 
of the principle in two environmental treaties, namely: the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer45 (a Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer46
Chapter 3 analyses the concepts of evolution and graduation and 
explores the definition of the concepts. The chapter explores the relationship 
between the concepts and the CDR principle. Various forms of evolution and 
graduation have been proposed and the chapter discusses these and ends 
with an overview of the use of the concepts in other treaties.  
) and the UNFCCC 
(including the Kyoto Protocol). 
Chapter 4 discusses the key elements that any model of evolution and 
graduation should include. It then proposes key elements for evolution and 
graduation for the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.  
The last chapter provides a summary of the study. It also presents 
conclusions and recommendations. 
                                                          
45 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 (1987) 26 ILM 1550  













2 Chapter 2 – Common but differentiated 
responsibilities 
The CDR principle has provided the basis for the development of an 
international climate change law for almost two decades. The following 
chapter will attempt to define the principle and outline its operation in 
international environmental law. It will begin with a discussion of the 
history of the principle, and then debate the rationale for the principle, 
before evaluating its legal status. The chapter will then go on to discuss the 
content of the principle and the different forms of differentiation in 
international law before discussing the different tools or methods for 
implementing the principles. It will then discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the principles and then use two environmental treaties to 
illustrate its operation. Attention will now be turned to a discussion of how 
the principle has developed. 
2.1 History of the CDR Principle 
While Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development was the first articulation of the term ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities,’47 differentiation within multilateral 
agreements has existed for several decades. 48
                                                          
47 Christopher Stone ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities in international law’ (2004) 98 2 American 
Journal of International Law 276 at 278; Philippe Sands Principles of international environmental law 2ed. 
(2003) 285; Rajamani (note 31) at 120; Patricia Birnie et al International law and the environment 3ed. (2009) 
132 
 Differentiation (also referred 
to in this study as differential treatment) evolved through three separate but 
related processes in international law: the use of differentiation in treaty 
law, the use of differential treatment in trade and economic development 
and differentiation in international environmental law beginning with the 
Stockholm Declaration in 1972. 












2.1.1 Differentiation in treaty law 
The first international treaty to differentiate between parties was the 
Treaty of Versailles in 191949 which encompassed the constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). The constitution of the ILO 
recognised, under its general principles (Article 427) that it would be 
difficult to immediately achieve strict uniformity in employment standards 
given the differing conditions in climate, customs and economic 
opportunity.50 The parties however, would ‘endeavour to apply certain 
methods and principles for regulating labour conditions so far as their 
special circumstances will permit.’51
Since then, other treaties such as the Multilateral Limitation of Naval 
Armament (Washington Naval Treaty)
 
52 and the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT)53 have adopted non-uniform standards and norms.54
                                                          
49 Stone (note 47) at 278;  
 
Other examples include the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
50 International Labour Organization (ILO), Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1 April 
1919. Available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles400-427.htm  [Accessed 1 December 2009] 
51 Ibid. As shall be seen later, the use of language such as that used here, which recognises the special 
circumstances of parties to a treaty, is a form of differentiation. 
52 Ibiblio ‘Conference on the Limitation of Armament. Washington, November 21, 1921 to February, 6 1922.’ 
Available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/nav_lim.html  [Accessed 1December 2009]. Also known 
as the Five Powers Treaty, it limited the total tonnage of arms and equipment that the navies of each of the 
signatories could carry. The British Empire and the United States were each limited to 525,000 tons, Japan was 
limited to 315,000 tons and France and Italy were each limited to 175,000 tons (Article 4). See also Stone (note 
47) at 276. 
53 See generally ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Text of the general agreement. Geneva, July 1986.’ 
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2009]. Part IV 
titled ‘Trade and Development’ deals in detail with the circumstances of developing countries and makes 
provision for their use of special measures. This preferential treatment was introduced to the GATT in 1965. 
See also Stone (note 47) at 278. It has been said however, that while these provisions were designed to 
promote development and trade, they are nothing more than a set of aspirations with no legal force. See also: 
Alexander Keck and Patrick Low ‘Special and differential treatment in the WTO: Why, when and How?’ 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200403_e.doc  [Accessed 11 January 2010] 












(1946)55, the Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958),56 the Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969)57 and the Convention on 
the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1969).58
As Daniel Magraw notes, the conventions mentioned above do not 
specifically mention developing countries, or might not specifically favour 
developing countries
 As 
discussed in Section 2.5 below, these treaties in using terms such as ‘as far 
as possible’ and ‘as far as reasonable’, allow for differentiation in 
implementation because implementation would therefore be subject to the 
national circumstances of each Party.  
59
In a process related to the development of differentiation in treaty law, 
the international processes for trade and economic development also 
included some form of differentiation. 
 but the implementation of their provisions would 
almost certainly result in differentiation in favour of developing countries 
whose national circumstances would hinder them from fully implementing 
their provisions. 
2.1.2 Differentiation in trade and economic development 
After World War II the international community grew larger through the 
process of decolonisation. As more countries gained independence and 
joined the international legal fraternity, there was a call from the former 
colonies (most in the developing world) that developed countries (who were 
                                                          
55 Article 8(2) states that permit obligations must be complied with ‘as far as possible.’ See Daniel Barstow 
Magraw ‘Legal treatment of developing countries: differential, contextual and absolute norms.’ (1990) 69 1 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy  69 at 89;  
56 Article 5(1) requires that the exploitation of the continental shelf must not result in unjust interference with 
conservation of living resources. See Magraw (note 55) at 89 
57 Articles 3(2)(c) and 5 state that owners of all ships are jointly and severally liable for damage which is not 
‘reasonably’ seperable.  
58 Article 12 states that compensation shall be determined according to the principles of justice and equity. See 
Magraw (note 55) at 89 












mainly their colonial masters) should pay reparation for the deliberate 
under-development of the colonies, and the resources extracted from these 
colonies that contributed to the wealth of the developed countries.60
This led to the incorporation of special and differential treatment in 
various instruments relating to trade and development.
 While 
developed countries resisted this call, there was recognition that in order to 
facilitate the participation of developing countries in international trade 
there was a need to include special arrangements for them.  
61 As has already 
been discussed in section 2.1 above, the GATT in 1965 incorporated detailed 
provisions relating to the special treatment of developing countries.62 These 
rules have been further developed over the intervening years and were 
incorporated into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. For example, 
the GATT Enabling Clause of 197963 and the Uruguay Round Agreements 
which came into effect in 1995, made extensive provisions for the special 
and differential treatment of developing countries.64
In parallel to the developments in GATT, a new movement called the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) began in the early 1970s with 
developing countries demanding the creation of new rules allowing them to 
benefit from international trade.
 
65
                                                          
60 Philippe Cullet ‘Differential Treatment in International Law’ (1999) 10 3 EJIL 549 at 565; Magraw (note 55) at 
77; Atapattu (note 22) at 382 
 The NIEO demanded that the economic 
interests of developing countries should be protected, that positive 
61 Cullet (note 60) at 566 
62 See note 53 and accompanying text. 
63 Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries.  This clause was adopted to allow favourable (i.e. differential) treatment 
for developing and least developed countries that would otherwise violate Article 1 of the GATT. 
64 Edith Brown Weiss ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities in perspective.’ (2002) 96 American Society 
for International Law Proceedings 366 
65 Developing states were unhappy with the traditional international economic law and its protection of 












discrimination should be instituted in their favour and that international 
rules should be non-reciprocal.66 It was posited that differential treatment, 
in the form of international finance and technology transfer should be 
effected not as aid or charity, but as the entitlement of the developing 
countries.67 In fact, the proponents of the NIEO who were mainly developing 
countries, put forward several UN General Assembly resolutions seeking to 
establish the NIEO and although they had significant political impact, these 
resolutions were never implemented.68 This movement was of course, 
resisted by the developed countries and has since died away.69
While the NIEO has largely been left behind, some of its principles were 
carried over into international environmental negotiations,
 
70 particularly the 
era following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCED) that was held in Stockholm in June, 1972.71
2.1.3 Differentiation after the Stockholm Conference 
 
UNCED, also known as the Stockholm Conference was the first 
international gathering to consider global environmental issues. The main 
outputs of the conference were the Stockholm Declaration which contains 
26 principles and the Stockholm Action Plan which contains 109 
recommendations, some of which led to the establishment of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).72
                                                          
66 Cullet (note 60) at 566 
 
67 This movement was premised on the need for wealth redistribution and special dispensation in the 
repayment of international debt... 
68 Cullet (note 60) at 568 
69 Cullet (note 60) at 568; Atapattu (note 22) at 382 
70 Magraw (note 55) at 79 
71 Atapattu (note 22) at 382 
72













The Stockholm Declaration, in its Preamble, Principles 9 – 12 and 23 
makes repeated references to developing countries and their special needs.73 
The contribution of the Stockholm Declaration to the CDR principle did not 
end there as most environmental agreements concluded after the Stockholm 
Conference contain references to the special needs of developing countries.74 
In fact, Christopher Stone asserts that the environment is the ‘most fertile 
field for non-uniform obligations.’75
The environment specific conventions that have differentiated their 
obligations since the Stockholm Conference include the Convention on Long 
Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution (LTRAP)
 
76 and the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World 
Heritage Conventionm-WHC).77 Other examples include the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Vienna Convention 
and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention).78
Perhaps the best example of differentiation in treaty law is the Montreal 
Protocol of 1987 which provides different implementation schedules for 
different categories of Parties. The Protocol will be discussed in more detail 
 
                                                          
73 Atapattu (note 22) at 382 
74 Atapattu (note 22) at 395, Duncan French ‘Developing states and international environmental law: The 
importance of differentiated responsibilities’ (2008) 49 1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 40 
75 Stone (note 47) at page 279 
76 Convention on Long Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution 1979 (1979) 18 ILM 1442 
77 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 (1972) 11 ILM 1358. 
Article 4 places the duty of identification, protection and conservation of natural heritage on state Parties 
subject to the limits of their resources and where appropriate with international cooperation. As will be shown 
later, the provision of international assistance is another form of differentiations. See also Magraw (note 55) at 
75; French (note 74) at 40 
78 Magraw (note 55) at 94; Atapattu (note 22) at ; Stone (note 47) at; Tuula Honkonen The common but 













in section 2.8.1 below; suffice it to say that it was negotiated before there 
was a named principle on differentiation.  
The environmental treaties adopted during and after the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) namely the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have 
stronger language on differentiation than those adopted before the 
conference. This is probably because the development of the principle in the 
Rio Declaration would have had an influence on the negotiation of those 
treaties. 
To summarise, the development of the concept of differentiation in 
international law has been illustrated. It has been shown that although the 
term ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ was first enunciated by 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, differential treatment has existed for 
much longer in international law. This begs the question therefore, why 
there was and is a need for a distinct principle on differentiation if it has 
existed for so long and has been used in different treaties. Attention will now 
be turned to an analysis of the rationale for the existence of the CDR 
principle. 
2.2 Justification for the existence of the principle 
Ideas abound regarding the aim or rationale for the CDR principle and 
many scholars have advanced different reasons for its existence.79
Lavanya Rajamani asserts that the justification of the principle is based 
on two notions of equity. In the first instance, she quotes Henry Shue who 
 Different 
authors present different though somewhat related reasons for its existence. 
The ideas of four leading scholars will be highlighted here. This will be 
followed by the author’s own interpretation of the justification for the 
existence of the principle.  
                                                          
79 See generally: Atapattu (note 22); French (note 74); Magraw (note 55); Stone (note 47); Lavanya Rajamani  












states that Parties that take unfair advantage of others should bear an 
unequal burden in finding the solution to those problems.80 So for example, 
developed countries have benefited disproportionately from industries that 
cause environmental degradation but the costs of that degradation are 
borne by all countries; developed countries should therefore bear the 
unequal burden of remediating environmental problems. The second notion 
of equity arises from the capability to solve the problem. Here the character 
of developing countries, the inequalities in the international communities 
and the level of economic development of states should be taken into 
consideration when determining the level of commitments for different 
states; therefore developed countries should bear a higher burden.81
Daniel Magraw argues that there are 3 reasons for differential 
treatment in international law. The first reason is that in order to improve 
the chances of an agreement being successful, it is necessary to include 
developing countries.
  
82 This, he says, is because developing countries are 
the source of much of the world’s pollution, because they are home to most 
of the world’s population and because most developing countries lack the 
legal, technical and technological capacity to deal with environmental 
problems. Secondly, he states that political reasons will dictate the inclusion 
of differential treatment in international law.83
                                                          
80 Rajamani (note 7) at 123 
 With the majority of the 
world’s population, developing countries are important to developed 
countries in many areas not related to the environment and therefore their 
demands should not be ignored. Furthermore, since political leaders in 
developing countries have other priorities such as economic development, 
special incentives have to be included in order to encourage their 
participation. The third reason Magraw gives for differential treatment is the 
moral imperative to improve the standard of living of the world’s poorest 
81 Ibid 














Philippe Cullet proposes three reasons for the existence of the CDR 
principle. The principle of sovereign equality requires that all States are 
treated equally without any discrimination and that all international 
obligations should apply equally to all members of the international 
community.
 He says that environmental norms should be structured in a way 
that does not interfere with the effort to lift the poor from abject poverty. 
 85 However, not all states are equal in substantive terms and so 
Cullet’s first justification for the principle is that it can bring about 
substantive equality to an international community which is made up of 
unequal states. Secondly, he believes that the principle can provide the 
framework for less confrontational international relations.86
Another authority on differentiation in international law is Duncan 
French who proposes five reasons for the existence of CDR:
 Lastly, he 
believes that the third objective for the CDR will be the better and more 
effective implementation of environmental treaties. This, he argues is 
because differentiation constitutes an avenue for making international law 
more responsive to national circumstances (and thus more likely to be 
implemented in developing countries where a treaty requires costly 
measures). 
87
a) Firstly, he argues that the most obvious reason for the existence of 
the principle is the differing contributions of States to environmental 
degradation. He quotes with approval Chowdhury who states that 
 
                                                          
84 ibid 
85 Cullet (note 60) 550 - 563;  See also Atapattu (note 22) at 379 
86 Cullet believes that the link between differentiation and international cooperation exists at three levels. 1) 
Because solidarity is closely linked to differentiation countries need to cooperate to achieve the goals of 
environmental protection. 2) Developed countries will have specific interests that push them to provide 
favourable terms to developing countries in order to ensure that their own priorities are acted upon in the 
south. 3) States have differing responsibilities for the existing environmental problems and differing 
capabilities to deal with them therefore states must take on differing responsibilities for solving the problem. 












responsibility [for the implementation of solutions] must be unequal 
and proportional to the different contributions that states have 
made to environmental degradation. Given that developed countries 
have benefited disproportionately from environmental degradation, 
they should have to bear a higher burden in the improvement of the 
situation.88
b) Secondly he argues that since some countries have a larger capacity 
to tackle the causes of global environmental problems, they should 
bear a higher responsibility to solve these problems.
 
89
c) His third argument relates to the NIEO discussed above. He states 
that developed countries are ‘under an obligation to take into 
account the special needs and circumstances of developing 
countries’ when drafting international treaties. He says that this is 
in recognition of the fact that while combating environmental 
degradation is a priority of the global North, it is not necessarily one 
for the global South which has other pressing needs such as 
eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable economic growth.
 
90
d) Fourthly, he bases the need for differential treatment on the need for 
international cooperation. He argues that the international 
community has entered a new stage of international relations that 
requires States to act in ‘global partnership’ to solve the problems 
facing the planet. This notion of global partnership seeks to create a 
new and equitable partnership between the North and the South. He 
says that although the notion has not found purchase in 
 
                                                          
88 French (note 74) at 47 - 49 
89 French (note 74) at 50 - 51 












international law, it may prove to be an important justification for 
differentiation.91
e) Finally, he finds that the existence of the CDR may be justified 
because it provides inducement to hesitant States to participate in 
environmental treaties. This he argues, is because most developing 
countries do not see the benefit in agreeing to environmental 




Given what has been presented above, common themes can be distilled 
with regards to the justification for the existence of the CDR principle. They 
can be summarised as follows: i) to achieve a state of substantive equity 
amongst participants of an environmental treaty, ii) to allocate greater 
responsibility to those that have made a greater contribution to a particular 
problem, iii) to allocate greater responsibility to those that have more 
capacity to deal with a particular situation, iv) to recognise the special 
situation of developing countries, v) to recognise that different countries and 
groups of countries have different priorities and, vi) to promote the widest 
possible participation in a multilateral agreement. 
 
While the writer agrees with most of the reasons presented above, it is 
submitted that there are four main reasons for the existence of the principle. 
These are all based on the notion of equity and are expressions of the 
different dimensions of equity. In the writer’s view the following can best be 
described as the objectives of the CDR principle: 
• To achieve substantive equity (as noted above),93
                                                          
91 French (note 74) at 55 – 56 
 even though 
the principle of state sovereignty requires that States are treated 
equally, events in history have resulted in an unequal playing 
92 French (note 74) at 56 - 57 












field. One must therefore acknowledge that States are unequal 
and so any treaty or agreement that does not recognise this 
would be unjust and would probably fail, if not in negotiation 
then in implementation. For example the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Lesotho may be sovereign equals but in real terms these 
countries have very different attributes and Lesotho would 
require some level of manufactured advantage in order to 
participate in an environmental treaty to the same extent as the 
UK. 
• To assign greater responsibility to those States that have 
contributed more to a particular environmental problem, as 
advocated for by most scholars discussed above.  Most developed 
countries have based their development and owe the strength of 
their economies on more than 150 years of industrial 
development which has been accompanied in most cases by 
environmental pollution and degradation. This historical 
responsibility for global environmental problems cannot be easily 
written off and developed countries must therefore take the lead 
in solving environmental problems. The concept of equity is 
central to international environmental law; it incorporates the 
right to develop and recognises that the needs of the world’s poor 
must be given priority,94
                                                          
94
 Glazewski (note 72) at 13; Kidd (note 72) at 16; Kurukulasuriya and  Robinson (note 12) at 26 
 therefore poorer countries should not be 
expected to take onerous environmental obligations which may 
interfere with the right to develop. This assertion is also based on 
the principle of intra-generational equity which states that the 
use of natural resources by one segment of society must take into 
consideration the needs of other segments of society. It 












to fair access to resources and includes the concept of 
environmental justice.95
• To assign greater responsibility (as noted above)
 
96 to those 
States that have greater capacity to solve environmental 
problems, particularly if they have gained disproportionately from 
the creation of a certain set of environmental problems. While not 
agreeing to the entire thesis of the NIEO, the writer submits that 
there is some merit to the argument that colonialism created rich 
and poor classes of countries with developed countries in the 
former class and developing countries in the latter class.97 The 
gains that developed countries secured from both degrading the 
environment and from ‘plundering’ the colonies should therefore 
to a certain extent, contribute to the alleviation of environmental 
degradation.98 The writer states this with caution because this 
argument will surely not persist into perpetuity (and across all 
spectra of developmental issues) and at some point developing 
countries should have reached some level of development that 
negates this argument.99
• To achieve better and more effective participation in, and 
implementation of, environmental treaties. This is particularly so 
when participation in a treaty is not in the priorities of a country 
or group of countries or when the implementation of a treaty will 
impose a disproportionately high cost on developing countries. As 
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 Kurukulasuriya and  Robinson (note 12) at 27 
96 Cullet (note 60); French (note 74); Rajamani (note 7); Atapattu (note 22), Magraw (note 55) 
97 Cullet (note 60) 
98 Cullet (note 60); French (note 74); Rajamani (note 7); Atapattu (note 22), Magraw (note 55) 
99 There is not enough space to discuss the modalities of such a level of development, but if for example, a 
country like South Korea or Qatar reaches a level of human development (as indicated by the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index) that is expected of, or exceeds that of, a developed 













So, in summary, this section has briefly discussed the different reasons 
put forward by various scholars regarding the justification for the existence 
of the CDR principle. Furthermore, a set of objectives for the CDR principle 
have been suggested which encompass the various themes that have been 
set forward by previous authors. Given the above discussion, it is now 
important to investigate the content of the principle. 
 differentiation can be used as an inducement to 
compel States that would be wary of taking on obligations that 
would have negative impacts on their priorities. 
2.3 Content of the principle 
There is some level of agreement amongst the different scholars 
regarding the scope and content of the CDR principle. From the literature it 
is evident that the principle contains the following three elements, which are 
related to the rationale for the principle: i) the element of common 
responsibility, ii) the element of differentiated responsibility and, iii) the 
element of leadership by developed countries. Each of these will now be 
discussed in turn. 
The element of common responsibility 
This element of the CDR principle emanates from the concepts of ‘the 
common concern of humankind’ and ‘the common heritage of mankind.’101 
These concepts require that all States should take action to combat global 
environmental problems and they imply that there is a common interest 
within humankind to protect the environment, since the environment is a 
common global resource to which all are connected.102
                                                          
100 See generally French (note 74), Cullet (note 60), Magraw (note 55), Stone (note 47) 
 According to Philippe 
Sands, ‘common responsibility’ describes the shared obligation of two or 
101 Stone (note 47) at 276; French (note 74) at 45; Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton International 
environmental law 3ed (2004) 19 












more States towards the protection of a common environmental resource103 
and it applies ‘where a resource is not the property of, or under the 
jurisdiction of, a single country.’104 This is because no State enjoys 
sovereignty of global environmental resources which are the common 
heritage of all.105 While these concepts do not enjoy universal acceptance 
and have no common definition, there is a recognition by developed and 
developing countries on the need to act together to solve environmental 
issues.106
This element also evolved from the related principles of ‘global 
partnership’ and ‘cooperation.’
 
107 The principle of global partnership 
recognises that environmental resources and the problems associated with 
them to not respect political boundaries, that countries are ecologically 
interdependent, and the need for North-South cooperation and compromise 
to solve global environmental problems.108 The principle of cooperation 
states that countries are obliged, in the spirit of solidarity to collaborate in 
the prevention of transboundary pollution.109
The element of differentiated responsibility 
 
This element can be further divided into two separate themes, one of 
differential contribution to environmental degradation, and the other of 
different capabilities and resources for solving environmental problems. 
                                                          
103 Sands (note 47) at 286; Kiss and Shelton (note 101) at 19 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid 
106 French (note 74) at 46 
107 Rajamani (note 7) at 121; Atapattu (note 22) at 386; Sands (note 47) at 286; Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger 
‘Prospects for principles of international sustainable development law after the WSSD: Common but 
differentiated responsibilities, precaution and participation’ (2003) 12 1 RECIEL 54 at 56; Birnie et al (note 47) 
at 129 
108 Atapattu (note 22) at 387; Kurukulasuriya and  Robinson (note 12) at 29; Birnie et al (note 47) at 129 












Firstly, this element takes into consideration the historical contribution 
of different countries to global environmental degradation.110 It assigns 
greater responsibility to industrialised nations111
Secondly, this element of the CDR acknowledges that technology and 
capacity to deal with environmental problem resides in the global North.
 and builds on the polluter 
pays principle, where those most responsible for global pollution are 
required to take on more responsibility for the remediation of those 
problems. Internationally, this is hotly contested terrain and may be one of 
the reasons why the principle has not achieved widespread acceptance.  
112 
It recognises the special situation and the particular needs of developing 
countries.113 It requires that higher standards are set for developed 
countries and that more flexible terms are assigned to developing 
countries.114
The element of leadership by the developed countries 
 
This element of the CDR principle requires that developed countries 
should take the lead in combating environmental problems and assisting 
developing countries to develop sustainably.115
                                                          
110 French (note 74) at 47 
 It requires that developed 
countries should act first in dealing with environmental problems thus 
allowing developing countries much needed development space. An example 
of this is the UNFCCC which states that ‘the developed country parties 
111 French (note 74) at 47; Cordonier-Segger (note 107) at 56; Brown-Weiss (note 64) at 366; Sands (note 47) at 
286 
112 Rajamani (note 7) at 122; Brown-Weiss (note 64) at 366; Sands (note 47) at 286; Birnie et al (note 47) 
113 Rajamani (note 7) at 122 
114 Birnie et al (note 47)  












should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.’116
In engaging with the literature, it becomes clear that it is the last two 
elements of the CDR principle which are the most problematic in terms of 
definition and universal acceptance.
 
117 While developing countries push for 
its wide application in almost all multilateral environmental agreements, 
developed countries remain unconvinced about its utility in international 
environmental law. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that 
developed countries dispute whether they should be held accountable for 
the actions of previous generations, particularly when those previous 
generations were not aware of the negative consequences of their 
activities.118
So, to summarise, it has been shown in this section that the CDR 
principle is made up of three elements. What then is the legal status of the 
principle? 
  
2.4 Legal status of the principle 
Although there is not much agreement on what the CDR principle 
entails amongst the different authorities, the one thing that they agree on is 
that the legal status of the principle is not clear.  
Sources of international environmental law are generally the same as 
those of international law i.e. treaties, customary international law, general 
principles of law and in some cases judicial decisions and writings of 
publicists,119
                                                          
116 Art. 3 
 except that soft law plays an important role in the development 
117 See for example Biniaz (note 41); Stone (note 47) 
118 Ibid 
119
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II  [accessed 11 January 2010] . Glazewski (note 












of international environmental law.120 Therefore, in order ascertain whether 
the CDR principle constitutes a rule of law, it is necessary to investigate 
whether it has emerged from any of these sources of law.121
While different environmental treaties, especially those adopted at and 
after UNCED, have differentiated in one form or another, it is only the 
UNFCCC that has explicitly incorporated the CDR principle. It therefore 
binds only those States that are Parties to that Convention.
  
122 Even then it 
is not clear whether the principle is legally binding on the Parties.123 This is 
because it is not used in the operative text of the convention – it is found in 
the preamble and the chapeau of Article 4.124 Furthermore, the principle is 
couched in discretionary rather than prescriptive language125 which leaves 
the interpretation of its legal status within the Convention open to debate. 
Furthermore, while other treaties do not specifically mention the principle, 
they do differentiate in one form or another;126 however, some scholars have 
said that the tendency of various instruments to mandate special treatment 
for developing countries is not legally significant.127
                                                          
120
 Ibid 
 It can therefore not be 
said with conviction, that the principle forms an integral rule of treaty law 
and indeed some authorities have stated that it is ‘implausible to put the 
121 What follows is a brief analysis of the legal status of the CDR principle. It is by no means an exhaustive 
treatment of the subject given the constraints of space in this study. For a full and reasoned analysis, see e.g. 
Honkonen (note 78) at 293 
122 Kiss and Shelton (note 101) at 42 
123 Atapattu (note 22) at; Cullet (note 60) at 575 
124 Rajamani (note 79); Honkonen (note 78) at 302 
125 Rajamani (note 7) at 124 
126 As discussed in Section 2.1 above and Section 2.5 below there are different forms of differentiation, one of 
the most common being the consideration of the special circumstances of developing countries 
127 See for example, Anne Gallagher ‘The ‘new’ Montreal Protocol and the future of international law for 












principle of common but differentiated responsibilities forward as a principle 
of international law’.128
The extent to which the CDR principle forms part of international 
custom or is a general principle of law is also open for discussion. 
Customary international law is made up of two elements: ‘general practice 
and the conviction that such practice reflects or amounts to law.’
  
129 
Customary law is as binding as treaty law although customary law has a 
wider scope than treaty law.130 The CDR has certainly gained increasing 
amounts of attention since its incorporation in the Rio Declaration, though 
its content and scope remain vague with developed and developing countries 
having different interpretations on its status.131 Developed countries remain 
sceptical of the legal nature of the principle and view it as an ad-hoc 
principle to be called upon in the negotiation of certain treaties while 
developing countries on the other hand are eager to give the principle the 
status of customary international law.132 Given the indeterminacy of the 
content and scope of the principle, it is not clear whether developing 
countries can rely on the principle in consistently negotiating for favourable 
terms. There is agreement however, that State practice regarding the CDR 
principle is limited and inconclusive and it is clear that most developed 
countries to not agree to be bound by it.133
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has said that a principle can 
also be considered a customary rule of international law if it is used in a 
convention which has widespread and representative participation, and that 
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related state practice should be extensive and uniform.134 Though the 
principle has been explicitly used in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, 
the fact that the United States (US) has not ratified the Kyoto could prove to 
be a barrier to the acceptance of the principle as a binding rule of customary 
international law.135 Also, while the practice of including differentiated terms 
in multilateral environmental agreements may be considered widespread, 
there is too much inconsistency in its application and interpretation for it to 
be considered uniform.136
It is therefore probably too early to consider the CDR as a customary 
principle of international environmental law.
 Therefore, it is difficult to say that the CDR 
principle can be used as a conventional rule of customary law. 
137 In fact, it is evident that the 
principle cannot be considered to be legally binding. However, as Rajamani 
states, the focus on the legal status of the principle is misplaced and the 
principle still holds weight and will continue to influence international 
environmental law for some time to come.138 It might not be a rule of 
customary international law but it is certainly more authoritative than soft 
law.139 In fact, the CDR principle has certainly influenced the development 
of international environmental law to date: it can be considered a framework 
principle and it will probably the bedrock for burden sharing in international 
environmental law for some time to come.140
                                                          
134 Statutes of the ICJ (note ) Art.; this is contrast to the usual requirement that to be considered a rule of 
customary international law a principle should have existed and been maintained for long periods of time. See 
also Honkonen (note 78) at 300 
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137 French (note 74) at 387; Atapattu (note 22) at 387; Honkonen (note 78) at 301 
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It has been shown that the CDR principle has not emerged sufficiently 
from treaty law and customary international law in order to be considered a 
principle of international law. This as discussed may not be important as 
the principle has influenced the development of international environmental 
law to date. It may be useful to now consider the different forms of 
differentiation.  
2.5 Forms of differentiation 
Daniel Barstow Magraw recognises three ways in which differentiation 
between developed and developing countries can be achieved:141 through the 
use of absolute norms, contextual norms and differential norms.142 
Differential norms are those that at face value provide different standards 
for different categories of States.143 Contextual norms are those that seem to 
provide identical treatment to all States but whose application allows or 
requires the consideration of differences amongst countries.144 Absolute 
norms are those that provide for the identical treatment of all States and do 
not permit the consideration of mitigating factors.145
Several writers have quoted with approval Magraw’s characterisation 




                                                          
141 Other scholars have proposed different forms of differentiation. For example, while Christopher Stone 
identifies three versions of CDR, namely: rational bargaining CDR, equitable CDR and non-equitable CDR; these 
are related to the rationale for the principle rather than its form and function which is the purpose of this 
section. 
 This classification is chosen because although it was developed 
before the principle was coined in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, it 




146 See generally Cullet (note 60), French (note 74), Atapattu (note 22), Rajamani (note 7), Stone (note 47), 












provides an apt description of the manner in which the principle (and indeed 
differentiation) has operated since its emergence at UNCED.  
In the present study, three forms of differentiation are proposed: 
unconditional treatment (corresponding to the use of absolute norms), 
contextual differentiation (corresponding to the use of contextual norms) 




As already mentioned above, absolute norms provide identical 
treatment to all Parties. They do not require or permit the consideration of 
factors such as the socio-economic situation of the different Parties. 148 An 
example of this is CITES which applies uniform requirements for all Parties, 
regardless of the additional burden that implementation places on 
developing countries. They have the capacity to be precise but most tend to 
be ambiguous in nature, as they would have to be in order to secure as wide 
participation as possible.149 Unconditional treatment is included in this 
study as a form of differentiation because although absolute norms are 
designed to treat all Parties identically, some treaties may inadvertently 
allow differentiation if they allow the use of reservations or interpretative 
statements.150
Contextual differentiation 
 So in this case, Parties may exempt themselves from certain 
provisions of a treaty by including these reservations and differing 
interpretations. 
Contextual differentiation, as with, contextual norms will seem to 
provide identical treatment of all States. All States would share the same 
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commitments but the application of the obligations would however allow or 
require the consideration of varying characteristics or factors.151 This would 
typically require the balancing of multiple interests and factors. Contextual 
differentiation allows obligations that are usually indeterminate and wide 
latitude for compliance. It also allows flexibility in the implementation of 
agreements.152 Magraw argues that the use of contextual norms is desirable 
in four situations: i) when it is easier to reach consensus on contextual 
norm than on a precise issue or norm, ii) when the problems to be solved 
are clouded by uncertainty, iii) where the costs of determining a precise 




Concrete differentiation as with differential norms provides different 
standards for different sets of actors. Concrete differentiation provides more 
advantageous sets of standards for one group of States over another.154 It 
takes into account more than one type of interest and can be flexible or 
specific.155 Concrete differentiation can be implemented in such a way as to 
make it obvious that one set is favoured and it allows States to take into 
account socio-economic factors in negotiating and implementing an 
agreement.156
While unconditional treatment does not by its nature provide 
preferential treatment, contextual differentiation and concrete differentiation 
seem to provide preferential treatment for developing countries. To illustrate 
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this, attention will now focus on the methods for the implementation of the 
CDR principle. 
2.6 Methods for differentiation 
The tools for implementing the CDR are closely related to the forms of 
differentiation discussed above. While most of the tools for differentiation 
are associated with at least one form of differentiation they may however, be 
applicable to more than one. In fact the forms of differentiation are seldom 
implemented in isolation from each other but are usually employed in some 
combination.157
Contextual differentiation 
 These are not rigid classifications but rather a grouping of 
like instruments together. This discussion will be concerned with concrete 
differentiation and contextual differentiation because unconditional 
treatment is not designed to allow differentiation and it has already been 
illustrated in what instances differentiation may arise out of unconditional 
treatment. 
Contextual differentiation is generally flexible. It is usually 
implemented using grace periods and differentiated implementation 
timetables.158 For example, the Montreal Protocol allows developing 
countries to delay their compliance with the obligations in the Protocol. 
Contextual differentiation can also be implemented by allowing flexibility in 
the approach to implementation.159 It may also be implemented in 
agreements by making references to, or requiring the consideration of, the 
special needs and situation of developing countries.160 Examples of this are 
the CBD,161 the UNCCD162
                                                          
157 Honkonen (note 78) at 112 
 and the WHC which all require that the special 
158 Sands (note 47) at 289; Biniaz (note 41) at 359; Atapattu (note 22) at 393; Stone (note 47) at 278; Rajamani 
(note 79) at 93 
159 Rajamani (note 79) at 93 
160 Biniaz (note 41) at 360; French (note 74) at 39; Atapattu (note 22) at 393; Stone (note 47) at 278 












needs of developing countries should be taken into consideration. The 
Montreal Protocol even goes so far as to state that the successful 
implementation of the Protocol will depend on developed countries fulfilling 
their obligations to provide financial, technological and capacity building 
assistance.163
Contextual differentiation can also be implemented through the 
provision of international assistance which may be financial, technological 
or capacity building assistance.
 
164 For example, the Montreal Protocol 
establishes a Multilateral Fund to assist developing country Parties to 
implement the obligations of the Protocol. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), the funding entity for the Rio Conventions and some other 
multilateral environmental agreements, is another example of international 
assistance put in place to allow developing countries to meet their 
obligations under the various conventions.165
Concrete differentiation 
 
Concrete differentiation can usually be implemented using different 
categories of Parties or by applying different standards to different Parties or 
groups of Parties. In practice it is usually implemented using both. The 
Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol are good examples of treaties that 
implement differentiation through the use of different classes or categories 
of Parties. The Kyoto Protocol, places Parties into different categories. 
‘Parties included in Annex 1’ refers to those States that are included in 
Annex 1 of the UNFCCC which contains mainly industrialised countries, 
and any other country which applies to be included there. Non-Annex 1 
Parties are all other Parties that are not included in Annex 1 of the 
UNFCCC. Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol contains those that are included in 
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164 French (note74 ) at 41; Atapattu (note 22) at 393; Stone (note 47) at 278; Rajamani (note 79) at 93 












Annex 1 that are required to take on emissions reductions targets while all 
other Parties are not required to. This is an example of how the Kyoto 
Protocol applies different standards or obligations to different countries or 
groups of countries. 
Having explored the tools used to implement the CDR principle, the 
next section will deal with the strengths and weakness of the CDR principle 
as they relate to its acceptance as a principle of environmental law and its 
implementation internationally. 
2.7 Weaknesses of the CDR Principle 
The past few sections have dealt with the content, legal status, form 
and tools of implementation of the CDR principle. As the discussion of these 
has highlighted, there is a lot of disagreement and ambiguity with regards to 
the legal status, scope and content of the principle. There are other 
weaknesses related to the principle. 
Apart from its vagueness, the unclear legal status and lack of universal 
appeal,166 the CDR principle is plagued by the following weaknesses:167
• It is not clear whether the principle was designed to evolve. Will 
there be a point where those States that are currently advantaged 
by its implementation will no longer require preferential 
treatment? At what point should this happen? 
 
• There is no agreement as to when it applies. While it is assumed 
that the principle applies in the international arena, to global 
issues, it may also apply domestically. It also is not clear whether 
this principle will apply to all environmental treaties or only to 
certain agreements. Furthermore, it seems there is a tendency for 
developing countries to seek to apply the principle even in other 
realms of international law for example in the WTO. 
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• There is no definition of ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ to guide its 
implementation. This is one of the biggest weaknesses in the 
CDR principle. Related to this is the idea that there are only two 
categories to differentiate between: developed and developing.  
• The principle is over-argued and there seems to be a growing 
tendency by developing countries to try and apply the principle 
retro-actively to all environmental treaties. 
• While the interpretation of the CDR principle varies widely 
between developed and developing countries, both claim 
allegiance to the principles which creates tensions, particularly in 
the negotiation of new environmental agreements or new terms in 
existing ones. 
It is apparent that there are some serious flaws associated with the 
CDR principle. It is the opinion of the author though, that these are not fatal 
flaws and that as international environmental law develops, these 
weaknesses may be resolved. After all, several treaties that are based on 
differentiation have been adopted and implemented fairly successfully. 
2.8 Use of the principle in different treaties 
This section will briefly discuss two multilateral environmental 
agreements that implement differentiation. The first is the Montreal Protocol 
which was negotiated, adopted and implemented before UNCED. The 
Montreal Protocol contains some of the most classical examples of 
differentiation in international environmental law. The second is the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. 
2.8.1 The Montreal Protocol 
Concern over the hole in the ozone layer and the impact it was having 
on human health and the environment168
                                                          
168 For example the increase in ultra-violet radiation (UVB) results in increased incidents of skin cancer in 
humans and leads to the extinction of phytoplankton in Antarctica. Sands (note 47) at 343 












Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Ozone Convention) in 
1985. In brief, the Convention obligates Parties to:169
• Take appropriate measures to protect human health and the 
environment; examples include cooperation in observation and 




• Initiate and cooperate in research and scientific assessments
 
171
• Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-economic 
and legal information relating to the Convention; and cooperate 




The Convention does not set any targets or timelines for action and is 
just a skeletal framework convention which required further refinement.
 
173 
This was provided by the Montreal Protocol on Substance that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) which was adopted in 1987, entered into 
force on 1 January 1989 and has been ratified by 196 States.174
                                                          
169 Birnie et al (note 47) at 349; Sands (note 47) at 344; Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) at 102; The 
Convention has been described as weak (for example while the Convention commits Parties to take 
‘appropriate measures’ to protect the environment and human health, the nature of the measures is not 
defined. Neither does the Convention specify any particular substances to be controlled).and this mostly has to 
do with the fact that it seeks to balance the interests of the US, the European Commission and developing 
countries (particularly India, Brazil and China). The US was concerned that the unilateral actions that it had 
taken to reduce CFCs would place its own industries at a disadvantage if global action was not taken. The EC, 
where most CFC producing industries were located was concerned with the protection of those industries. 
Developing countries were concerned that any regime that restrained their use of ozone-depleting substances 
would inhibit their industrial growth and development agendas. 
 It 
170 Article 2 
171 Article 3 
172 Article 4 
173 Ibid 












establishes targets and timelines for reducing and eliminating a range of 
substances that deplete the ozone layer.175
The Protocol has subsequently been amended by the London 
Amendment (1990),
  
176 the Copenhagen Amendment (1992),177 the Vienna 
Amendment (1995),178 the Montreal Amendment (1997)179 and the Beijing 
Amendment (1999).180
While the commitments under the Montreal Protocol are the same for 
all Parties, it contains special provisions for developing countries which are 
considered by many to be innovative.
  
181 It does not make specific mention of 
the CDR principle it is certainly a clear example of how the principle should 
operate.182
                                                          
175 These substances are listed in Annexes A to E of the Protocol and are to be phased out according to the 
schedules laid out in Articles 2A to 2E. The main chemicals controlled by the Protocol are cholorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), halons, and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs).  
 It was formulated to ensure the participation of developing 
176 New scientific evidence pointed to the inadequacy of the standards contained in the Protocol and therefore 
the second Meeting of the Parties (MOP) adopted the London Adjustments and Amendments which 
introduced restrictions on CFCs and halons were tightened and two new substances (tetrachloromethange and 
trichloroethane) were introduced. Secretariat of the Montreal Protocol ‘Evolution of the Montreal Protocol’ 
Available at http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification_status/evolution_of_mp.shtml [Accessed 12 January 2010]; 
Birine et al (note 47) at 351; Sands (note 47) at 346; Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) at 103; Kiss and 
Shelton (note 101) at 318 
177 The fourth MOP adopted the Copenhagen Amendments which increased the restrictions on CFCs, halons, 
tetrachloromethane and trichloroethane. HCFCs and hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) and methyl bromide 
were included in the list of controlled substances. 
178 The seventh MOP adopted the Vienna Amendment. These amendments introduced a phase-out timetable 
for industrialized countries methyl bromide (to be completely phased out by 2010), strengthened the 
restrictions on industrial country use of HCFCs and introduced a phase out timetable for HCFCs (2030 for 
industrialized countries and 2040 for developing countries) 
179 The Montreal Amendment was adopted by the ninth MOP and accelerated the phase out date of methyl 
bromide from 2010 to 2005 and introduced the requirements for licensing systems. 
180 The eleventh MOP adopted the Beijing Amendment which added bromochloromethane to the list of 
controlled substances and required that it was to be phased out by 2002 
181 Birnie et al (note 47) at 349; Sands (note 47) at 344; Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) at 102; Atapattu 
(note 22); French (note 74); Cullet (note 60) 












countries, taking into consideration their special needs, their low 
contribution to ozone-depletion and the fact that growth in the use of ozone-
depleting substances was likely to occur in developing countries rather than 
developed countries.  
In addition to preambular statements that recognise that ‘take into 
account the developmental needs of developing countries’ and that global 
emissions of certain substances should be ‘equitably’ controlled, the 
Montreal Protocol (1987) gives developing countries three special privileges: 
• Developing countries were given a ten year grace period that 
temporarily excludes them from obligations to phase out ozone-
depleting substances.183
• Developing countries were also given different base years for the 
calculation of phase-out commitments.
  
184
• Developing countries were provided with access to financial and 
technical assistance.
 
185 Furthermore, the Protocol states that 
the capacity of developing countries to meet their commitments 
under the Protocol would depend on developed countries 
meeting their financial and technological transfer obligations. It 
establishes a financial mechanism, for financial and technical 
cooperation. In addition a Multilateral Fund is established with 
the purpose of meeting the incremental costs of implementation 
of the Protocol.186
As seen from the above, the Montreal Protocol makes wide use of 
contextual differentiation through the establishment of delayed 
implementation schedules and international assistance in the form of 
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technical and financial cooperation. So even though the Montreal Protocol 
was negotiated and adopted before the articulation of the CDR in Principle 7 
of the Rio Declaration, it implements the rationale, forms and methods of 
the CDR principle. 
Another treaty that implements the CDR principle is the UNFCCC 
which shall now be discussed. 
2.8.2 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol187
The UNFCCC 
 
The UNFCCC is based on the CDR principle.188 Differential treatment is 
evidenced throughout the Convention, beginning with the Preamble, through 
the principles and to the substantive commitments. The Preamble states 
that climate change should reflect the environmental and developmental 
context, that ‘standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate 
and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries,’189 and that 
GHG emissions in developing countries will have to continue to grow to 
allow these countries to meet their social and development needs.190
Furthermore, Article 3 contains an explicit reference to the CDR 
principle, stating that Parties should protect the climate system for future 
and present generations on ‘the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.’
 
191
                                                          
187 Although the provisions of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have been briefly discussed in Section 1.2 
above, this section will discuss them in more detail in order to highlight how the CDR principle has been 
implemented by the Convention and the Protocol. 
 The 
commitments contained in Article 4 are prefaced by the chapeau that states 
that all Parties must take ‘into account their common but differentiated 
188 Honkonen (note 78) at 122; Birnie et al (note 47) at 358 - 359 
189 Preambular paragraph 10 
190 Preambular paragraph 3 












responsibilities and their specific national and regional development 
priorities.’192 It is important to note as discussed in section 2.4 that the CDR 
principle is not a binding rule but rather that it has the character of an 
influential soft law principle.193
Although the UNFCCC is, as its name suggests, a framework convention, 
it does establish some commitments, a financial mechanism, important 
guiding principles (which should be implemented by any protocols to the 
convention) and subsidiary bodies to the Convention.
 
194
The following paragraphs will provide a summary of the obligations for 
the different categories of Parties under the Convention, and will highlight 
how the CDR principle has been implemented in the UNFCCC. 
 The Convention has 
three categories of Parties: Parties included in Annex I (also known as Annex 
I Parties – these are all industrialised Parties); Parties included in Annex II 
(also known as Annex II Parties – these are mainly Parties belonging to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]); and 
Parties not included in Annex I (also known as Non-Annex I Parties – these 
are mainly developing countries). Commitments are allocated along these 
lines. 
General obligations 
All parties are required amongst other things to prepare national 
inventories of GHG emissions; conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of 
GHGs; implement measures to mitigate climate change; promote and 
cooperate in the development and diffusion of technologies that reduce GHG 
                                                          
192 Article 4 
193 Many scholars have reported the tensions between developed and developing countries regarding the 
insertion on an article specifically dealing with ‘Principles’. Even though developing countries sought to include 
binding principles as a separate article, developed countries were opposed to this as they did not want the 
principles to attain the status of customary law. See for example, Honkonen (note 78) at 123; Rajamani (note 
7) at 125; Sands (note 47) at 358; Birnie et al (note 47) at 359 












emissions; cooperate in preparing for adaptation to climate change; and 
prepare and submit national communications to the COP.195
GHG emission reduction commitments 
 
Annex I Parties are required to adopt national policies and measures 
with the aim of returning their GHG emission levels, individually or jointly to 
1990 levels by the year 2000.196 Scholars consider these commitments to be 
soft targets which do not contain strong, clear commitments.197 Non-Annex I 
Parties have no emission reduction commitments under the Convention. 
Parties that were making the transition to market economies (also known as 
Countries with Economies in Transition or CEIT) when the Convention was 
negotiated were given flexibility in implementing their commitments.198
Financial and technology transfer 
  
Annex II Parties are required to provide new and additional financial 
resources to developing countries for the full costs of meeting their reporting 
requirements under the Convention.199 Furthermore, Annex II Parties are 
required to provide financial resources to help developing countries meet the 
incremental costs for undertaking their general obligations under the 
Convention.200 Annex II Parties are also required to provide assistance to 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change.201
                                                          
195 Article 4(1) 
 Finally, Annex II Parties are required to take steps to promote, 
196 Article 4(2) 
197 Article 4(2). Niklas Hoehne ‘Evolution of commitments under the UNFCCC: Involving newly industrialised 
economies and developing countries’ Available at http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-medien-
e/mysql_medien.php?anfrage=Kennummer&Suchwort=2235 [Accessed: 15 June 2009]; Birine et al (note 47) 
at 360; Sands (note 47) at 365 
198 Article 4 (6) 
199 Article 4(3) 
200 Ibid 











facilitate and finance the transfer of technology and expertise to developing 
country Parties.202 The Convention states that the ability of developing 
countries to meet their obligations under the Convention will depend on 
Annex II Parties fulfilling their commitments for finance and technology 
transfer.203
Reporting requirements 
 These are obligations for Annex II Parties only. 
All parties are required to communicate to the COP information relating 
to steps taken to implement the Convention, national inventories of GHG 
sources, sinks and reservoirs.204
The Convention requires Annex 1 Parties to submit initial 
communications within 6 months of entry of force of the Convention for 
them, and annually thereafter.
  
205 Non-Annex 1 Parties were only required to 
make their initial communications after three years or after financial 
resources had been made available to them.206 Least developed countries 
were only required to submit initial communications at their own 
discretion.207
Annex 1 Parties are further required to include detailed information 
regarding measures and policies to mitigate climate change, a specific 
estimate of the impact these policies and measures are expected to have on 
GHG emissions trends, and information regarding their provision of funds 
and facilitation of the transfer of technology to developing countries.
 
208
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203 Articles 4(3) and 7 
204 Articles 4(1)(j) and 12(1) 
205 Article 12(5) 
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As seen from the above, the Convention utilises both concrete 
differentiation through the creation of different categories of Parties with 
different commitments, and contextual differentiation through the provision 
of financial and technological assistance and language exhorting the 
consideration of the special needs of developing countries. This is carried 
over into the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
Almost as soon as the UNFCCC entered into force, Parties began to 
review the commitments contained in the Convention.209
The Kyoto Protocol differentiates amongst Parties in three main ways. 
While Annex I Parties are allocated mitigation commitments, non-Annex I 
Parties are not assigned any binding emissions reduction obligations. 
Secondly, amongst those Parties with mitigation commitments, CEIT were 
granted concessions with regards to the implementation of the Protocol in 
accordance with Article 4(6) of the Convention. This has mainly been 
through the use different years as the reference points for the calculation of 
their GHG emission reduction commitments. Lastly, only Annex II Parties 
are required to fund the financial and technological flows to developing 
countries that are required by the Protocol. 
 This was in 
response to scientific evidence that the commitments were not adequate to 
achieve the goal of avoiding catastrophic climate change. The COP launched 
a negotiation process that resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at 
the third COP. 
This chapter has analysed in detail the CDR principle. It has traced the 
development of differential treatment in international law from treaty law in 
the early 1900s, through international trade and economic development, to 
the post-Stockholm era of multilateral environmental agreements. The 
chapter has discussed the rationale for the CDR principle, the content and 
the legal status of the principle. The different forms of and tools for 
                                                          












differentiation have been discussed and two different treaties have been 
used to illustrate the implementation of differential treatment in 
international environmental law. 
A question central to this study remains unanswered. Has the CDR 
principle been designed to evolve or does its application remain rigid with no 
flexibility in the definitions used to differentiate amongst different States? 
Does the principle include a mechanism by which some developing 
countries could at some point begin to take on responsibilities, or conversely 
by which some developed countries could be relieved of their commitments? 














3 Chapter 3 – Evolution and graduation 
Given the rationale for the CDR principle and the role it plays in the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, it is important to understand whether the 
scope of the principle allows for progression in the status of developing 
countries. This chapter will discuss whether the CDR principle is flexible 
enough to permit developing countries that have advanced to a certain stage 
to take on commitments within the climate change treaty system. The 
chapter begins by analysing whether the CDR principle encompasses the 
notions of evolution and graduation. It then moves on to suggest a definition 
of the concepts of evolution and graduation before it ends with a brief 
discussion of some of the most prominent models for evolution and 
graduation that have been proposed to date.  
3.1 The CDR principle and the need for evolution and graduation 
The differing interpretations of the CDR principle certainly present an 
obstacle to its acceptance as a principle of international environmental law. 
For example, while the US Senate accepts that the CDR principle is 
important for the climate change treaty system, it maintains that the 
principle requires that all Parties should accept emissions reduction 
commitments, and that these should be differentiated amongst the 
Parties.210
There is therefore, a need to reconcile these two opposing 
interpretations. More specifically, there is a need to ascertain whether the 
CDR principle results in permanent divisions amongst Parties, whether it 
allows flexibility and evolution of the status of Parties or whether it exempts 
developing countries from ever taking mitigation commitments. 
 On the other hand, developing countries argue that the CDR 
principle exempts them from taking on emissions reduction commitments. 
                                                          
210 Stone (note 47) and Rajamani (note 7) both report that the in the immediate aftermath of the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the US Senate was in support of the CDR principle and the fact that the principle requires 












In order to do this, it is necessary to revisit the Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration which states that 
… In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of 
the technologies and financial resources they command… 
A careful reading of Principle 7 reveals that it does not create rigid or 
static divisions. Furthermore, Principle 7 does not imply any special 
exemption of developing countries from being assigned any commitments in 
international agreements. In fact, apart from developed countries 
acknowledging that they bear a responsibility in the pursuit of sustainable 
development, Principle 7 stops short of requiring developed countries from 
taking the (only) burdens in multilateral environmental agreements and in 
transferring technologies and finances to developing countries.211
… The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof…  
 In the 
climate change context Article 3 of the UNFCCC, states that  
Again, there is nothing in this Article that suggests explicitly or 
implicitly that the CDR principle is inflexible and that developing countries 
should be afforded a permanent exemption from any binding emissions 
reduction commitments, apart from stating that developed countries should 
take the lead in combating climate change. 212
                                                          














Furthermore, an extensive review of the literature on the objectives, 
scope and content of the CDR principle,213 does not reveal any interpretation 
that suggests that developing countries, with their special circumstances 
and their low contributions to environmental degradation should be excused 
from any commitments in the climate regime.214 In fact, Rajamani argues 
that at some point in the evolution of each multilateral environmental 
agreement, the CDR principle should not be necessary as any and all valid 
grounds for its existence expire.215
Moreover, given the scale of global warming and the urgency required 
to avoid catastrophic climate change, advanced developing countries will 
have to take on some form of emissions reductions commitment because 
even if developed countries were to reduce their emissions to zero this would 
no longer be sufficient to deal with the climate change problem.
 
216 What is 
more, the absolute emissions of some developing countries will overtake the 
emissions of developed countries in the near future.217
                                                          
213 Please see Chapter 2 for an in-depth review of the history, rationale, content, legal status and weaknesses 
of the CDR Principle. See also authors such as Cullet (note 60); Rajamani (note 79); Honkonen (note 78) 
 In fact it is estimated 
214 See for example Cullet (note 60); Stone (note 47); Rajamani (note 7); Rajamani (note 79); Honkonen (note 
78); French (note 74); 
215 Rajamani (note 79) 173 - 174 
216 This is attributed to the amount of GHGs already in the atmosphere and the so called lag effects where 
climate effects of GHGs released into the atmosphere only manifest several years later. Herman Ott et al 
‘South-North Dialogue on Equity in the Greenhouse’ at 2. Available at 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/04Ott-etal-SouthNorthDiaLogue.pdf [Accessed 15 January 
2010]; Harald Winkler et al ‘Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex 1 countries’ 
(2006) 5 5 Climate Policy 469  at 470; Niklas Hoehne and Esther Lahme ‘Types of future commitments under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol post 2012’ at 5. Available at 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ecofyspost2012targets20sept05.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2010]; Asbjorn 
Torvanger et al ‘Broadening the climate regime’ at 1. Available at http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/3604.pdf 
[Accessed 15 January 2010] 
217 This does not include the historical emissions of developed countries since the age of industrialization 
began. It refers only to current annual emissions. Hoehne and Lahme (note 216) at 5; MGJ den Elzen ‘Exploring 
post-Kyoto climate regimes for differentiation of commitments to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations’ at 
2. Available at http://rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/728001020.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2010]; Marcel Berk 
et al ‘Options for differentiation of future commitments in climate policy: how to realize timely participation to 












that China has overtaken the USA as the world’s largest emitter of carbon-
dioxide.218
There is therefore a need, when discussing and implementing the CDR 
principle, to move beyond the simple (but deeply entrenched) divide between 
developed and developing countries.
 Advanced developing countries should therefore participate in 
mitigation commitments in a way that conforms with the CDR principle. 
219 This is particularly so as there is no 
accepted definition of developed and developing countries in the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol.220
  This need could be fulfilled through the development of a mechanism 
for the evolution of the climate regime and the graduation of certain 
developing countries within the regime herein after referred to collectively as 
‘evolution and graduation’. 
 
3.2 Definition of the concepts of evolution and graduation 
The simple developed/ developing country divide masks differences 
amongst developing countries (and developed countries as well).221 For 
example there are vast differences between South Korea and Mozambique, 
which are both classed as developing countries within the climate change 
regime. South Korea is ranked 26th in the Human Development Index (HDI) 
while Mozambique is at 172, near the bottom of the rankings.222 At the same 
time there are also big differences between Norway which is ranked first in 
the HDI and the Ukraine which holds 85th
                                                          
218 International Energy Agency ‘Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion – highlights. 2009 edition’ 
Available at 
 position. 
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2010];  
219 Honkonen (note 78) at 179; Cullet (note 43) at 110; Torvanger (note 216) at 7;  
220 Cullet (note 43) at 113; Honkonen (note 78) at 187; Hoehne et al ( note 216) at 12 
221 Honkonen (note 78) at 179; Cullet (note 43) at 110 
222 The HDI is compiled by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is an indicator of the level 
of the advancement of countries. It is made up of three elements namely: life expectancy (which is used as an 
indicator of population health and longevity); knowledge and education (includes adult literacy rates, and 
primary, high and tertiary enrolment rates); and standard of living (measured as gross domestic product per 












Since the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol annexes were created in the 
early to mid-1990s the circumstances of different countries have changed, 
some for the better and some for worse.223 Some non-Annex 1 countries 
such as South Korea, Singapore and Qatar are more affluent than many 
Annex 1 countries.224
There have been more than a few articles and other publications 
dedicated to proposing different models for evolution and graduation 
although none of them have explicitly defined them.
 Mechanism are therefore required to update the 
commitments contained within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol to reflect 
these changes in circumstances. Two such mechanisms are evolution and 
graduation. 
225
… the adjustment of the treaty over time to include more 
participants in mitigation commitments, specifically aimed at 
involving those developing countries with large and rapidly 
growing economies and ever increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions…. 
 In order to set the 
parameters for this discussion on evolution and graduation it is necessary to 
provide working definitions for these terms. It is therefore submitted that in 
the context of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol evolution is 
While evolution can involve any Party that does not currently have 
emissions reduction commitments, it is specially framed to involve the so 
called ‘emerging economies.’226 Evolution can either be incremental with a 
gradual increase in Parties or it can be drastic or comprehensive, involving 
structural changes to the legal architecture of the treaty concerned.227
                                                          
223 Honkonen (note 78) at 188; Cullet (note 43) at 112 
 
224 UNDP (note 222). 
225 See for example Hoehne et al (note 176); Honkonen (note 78); Hoehne and Lahme (note 216); Den Elzen 
(note 217); Ott et al (note 216); Winkler et al (note 216); Torvanger et al (note 216) 
226 Emerging economies is used here to designate those newly industrialised countries and rapidly 
industrialising countries 












In the context of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol it is submitted that 
graduation can be defined as  
… the progression of a country or group of countries from one 
level of mitigation commitments to another…. 
Graduation is a subset of evolution and can take place on an ad-hoc basis 
or it can be based on pre-defined rules.228
Furthermore, for purposes of this discussion evolution and graduation 
are placed within the framework of the CDR principle. That is to say that 
evolution and graduation can only be justified if they contribute to the 
objectives of the principle namely: i) to achieve substantive equality; ii) to 
assign responsibility for contribution to the problem; iii) to assign 




Evolution and graduation seek to answer the big question of who 
mitigates and by how much?
 
230
3.3 Forms of evolution and graduation already proposed 
 
How can evolution and graduation be designed in such a way that they 
are in keeping with the CDR principle and do not jeopardise the legitimate 
development needs of developing countries? Various models for post 2012 
climate change mitigation commitments with elements of evolution and 
graduation have been proposed and many of them incorporate the CDR 
principle. These models generally fall into two significant groups: one 
                                                          
228 Berk et al (note 217) at 466 
229 For a detailed discussion of these objectives please see Section 2.2 above. 












modelled on the theory of contraction and convergence and the other on the 
theory of responsibility and capabilities.231
In this section we will examine four prominent proposals that have 
strong evolution and/ or graduation elements. These are contraction and 
convergence (the original model), the multi-stage approach, equity in the 
greenhouse framework and the greenhouse development rights framework. 
 
3.3.1 Contraction and convergence 
The contraction and convergence (CC) model was first developed by the 
Global Commons Institute (GCI) in the early 1990s.232 It approaches 
emissions reduction commitments from a resource sharing perspective 
rather than a pollution control problem. The global atmosphere is viewed as 
a global commons which should be shared equally between the people and 
countries of the world.233
There are three steps in the CC model. In the first step, a global 
emissions pathway is agreed. This pathway leads to the long-term reduction 
of global GHG emissions to arrive at a concentration that is deemed to be 
safe.
 
234 Thus the global GHG emissions would fall on an annual basis until 
they reach that safe level. This first step is termed ‘contraction.’235 In the 
second step, annual emissions limits would be set and each country would 
be allocated a share of this limit.236
                                                          
231 Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou ‘Frameworks and proposals: A brief, adequacy and equity-based evaluation 
of some prominent climate policy frameworks and proposals’ at 7. Available at 
 Any country with surplus emissions 
http://www.boell.de/ecology/climate/climate-energy-1967.html [Accessed 15 January 2010] 
232 Hoehne et al (note 176) at 26 
233 Berk et al (note 217) at 475 
234 The GCI proposed carbon-dioxide concentrations of 450 parts per million by volume by the year 2100. 
Global Commons Institute ‘Contraction and convergence. A global solution to a global problem.’ Available at 
http://www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html [Accessed on 15 January 2010] 













allocations (most likely to be developing countries), would be able to sell 
them to countries where there would be emissions shortfalls (most likely to 
be developed countries), which would probably be in developed countries.237
In the final step called ‘convergence,’ global emissions limits and 
allocations would reduce per year so that at some point in the future, all 
countries would have equal per capita emissions.
 
238 So although allocations 
would initially reflect the current emissions profiles, over time they would 
reach a stage where countries are allocated equal per capita emissions 
limits.239 In this step, countries receive emissions allocations in proportion 
to the size of their populations. At some point in the future there would be a 
cut-off point where increases in population would no longer be counted and 
a maximum population size that would be counted towards the calculation 
of emissions allocations.240
The CC model proposes evolution through the total restructuring of the 
architecture of the climate treaty system in that it would allocate per capita 
emissions rights to all Parties. That is, all Parties – developing and developed 
– would participate in the regime from the beginning and there would be no 
annexes. In the beginning emissions allocations would be differentiated and 
would eventually converge to become equal. Theoretically, those countries 
with large populations would have large allocations and vice versa. This 
model would also, in theory favour some developing countries because while 
they would get relatively large emissions allocations, they would only use a 
small proportion of them and sell the rest, thus facilitating the flow of funds 
to the developing world. 
 
The CC model is, at face value, a progressive proposal for implementing 
the CDR principle in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. There are, however, 
















some weaknesses with the model that should be highlighted. Firstly, 
although it would seem as if developing countries would benefit from selling 
excess allocations,241 the model does not take into account the historical 
responsibility of developed countries, one of the principal elements of the 
CDR principle.242 The model also does not take into account capability to 
pay, another important element of the principle.243
3.3.2 The multi-stage approach    
 
The Multi-Stage Approach (MSA) was based on a proposal by Brazil to 
the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM)244 which 
suggested that emissions reduction commitments should be shared amongst 
Annex 1 Parties based on their contribution to global temperature rise and 
climate change.245 The approach has been developed and refined by various 
scholars.246
The model is based on the capability-responsibility (CR) index which is 
used to calculate each country’s share of emissions reduction commitments. 
The responsibility of each country is defined as the per capita carbon-
dioxide emissions and capability is the per capita income of each country.
  
247
                                                          
241 Baer and Athanasiou (note 231) 15 – 18 argue that most developing countries would actually be hampered 
by the allocation of emissions rights envisaged by this model. They point to the legitimate need of most 
developing countries to develop (and hence increase emissions) and state that the allocations would not be 
sufficient to cover this need. 
 
The model proposes the incremental evolution of the climate treaty 
242 Ibid; Hoene et al (note 176) 43 – 44; Baer et al (note 42) at 104 
243 Ibid 
244 The AGBM was constituted in 1995 by the UNFCCC COP 1 to begin a process that would eventually lead to 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Kiss and Shelton ( note 101) at 322; Kurukulasuriya and Robinson (note 12) 
at ;  
245 Hoehne et al (note 176) at 26; Den Elzen (note 217) at 10 
246 See for example Den Elzen (note 217); Torvanger et al (note 216); De Elzen et al (note216 ); Berk et al ( note 
217) 













The MSA proposes three
 with the gradual expansion over time of the UNFCCC’s Annex 1 
and the possible addition of other annexes. 
249 categories into which countries are divided 
according to their development levels and needs.250 The model aims to place 
countries with similar economic, development and social attributes in the 
same group thus assigning them comparable efforts.251 The categories and 
their related commitments are as follows:252
Stage 1: countries in this category are the least developed 
countries that are most concerned with securing the basic 
needs of their populations. Correspondingly, the countries in 
this category have no quantified emissions reduction or 
limitation commitments and are allowed to follow an 
unconstrained development (and emissions) pathway.
 
253 
Countries in this category would be Angola, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Iraq and Vietnam.254
Stage 2: countries in this category are those that have rapidly 
growing economies and concomitantly high GHG emissions. 
These are mostly advanced developing countries. These 
countries have their emissions limited when compared to a 
business as usual pathway. This could either be achieved 
through improving the carbon intensity of their economies or an 
 
                                                          
248 Den Elzen (note 217) at 2 
249 Some variations of the model propose 4 categories. 
250 Den Elzen (note 217); Torvanger et al (note 216); De Elzen et al (note 216); Berk et al ( note 217) 
251 Den Elzen et al (note 216) at 2 
252 Ibid 
253 Ibid 
254 Torvanger et al (note 216); The countries placed in each category would depend on the factors or criteria 
used to define the stages and the thresholds that are set for each category. For example if HDI is included in 












absolute slowing down of emissions growth. The magnitude of 
the emissions limitation would correspond with each countries 
capability (defined as GDP per capita).255 Countries that would 
be found in this category include China, Indonesia, Egypt, 
Botswana, South Africa, Thailand and Mexico.256
Stage 3:
 
257 the countries in this country are industrialised and 
have historical responsibility for causing global warming and 
climate change. Emissions reduction commitments are allocated 
according the each country’s responsibility for climate 
change.258 The countries in this category have binding 
commitments to reduce their emissions in absolute terms. In 
addition to emissions reduction commitments, countries in this 
category would be obligated to provide finance, technology and 
capacity building to help developing countries move from one 
category (stage) to another.259
Developing countries would move from one stage to another or 
graduate, after exceeding certain agreed thresholds for example after 
reaching a certain GDP per capita.
 All countries in Annex 1 would 
automatically be placed in this category. Other countries that 
could be found in this category include Singapore, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, South Korea, Israel and Cyprus. 
260
                                                          
255 Ibid 
 The model assumes that developing 
countries would achieve net gains rather than net losses in moving from one 
256 Torvanger et al (note 216)  
257 A fourth possible category could be placed before Category 3 in which developing countries would be 
required to stabilise their emissions for a certain length of time before starting on absolute emissions 
reduction commitments. See for example Den Elzen (note 216). 
258 As per the Brazilian proposal, each country’s individual reduction would depend on its historical 
contribution to climate change and would be proportional to its share of GHG emissions per capita 
259 Ibid 












stage or category to another (from the finance and technology transfers 
received).261 The constituents of each category, the thresholds for each 
category and the commitments for each category 2 and 3 country would be 
reviewed after each commitment period. Countries that have exceeded 
certain thresholds would then be moved from one category to another.262
This model caters for most aspects of the CDR principle.
 
 263 In fact the 
model has some innovative features which if adopted could lead to a 
relatively equitable climate regime. However, the model does have some 
weaknesses. Firstly, it would restrict the growth of most rapidly 
industrialising countries by requiring them to limit and in some cases 
reduce their GHG emissions264 and this would not be equitable. Secondly, 
the model is quite complex including many different policy variables.265 
Finally, the model could potentially ignore the role historical responsibility 
has played by placing developing countries such as Singapore and Chile in 
the same category as Annex 1 countries. This is not likely to be accepted by 
any developing country.266
3.3.3 Equity in the greenhouse 
 
The Equity in the Greenhouse (EIG) model was developed by the South-
North Dialogue (SND) in 2004.267
                                                          
261 Honkonen (note 78) at 181 
 It is related to the MSA model described in 
Section 3.3.2 above and as such is based on the Brazilian proposal and also 
proposes the incremental evolution of the climate treaty system with the 
gradual expansion over time of the UNFCCC’s Annex 1 and the addition of 
262 Den Elzen (note 217) at 4 
263 Den Elzen (note 216) at 2 
264 Baer and Athanasiou (note 231)  
265 Den Elzen et al (note 216) at 
266 Torvanger (note 216) at 22 
267 Ott et al (note 216) at 5; Winkler et al (note 216) at 469; Honkonen (note 78) at 188; Baer and Athanasiou 












other annexes. The EIG model proposes six categories into which countries 
are divided. The UNFCCC categories (Annex I/ Annex II/ non-Annex I) as the 
basis for the model.268
Each category has different mitigation commitments as calculated by 
the responsibility-capability-potential indicator (RCP). Responsibility is 
based on per capita cumulative carbon-dioxide emissions for the period 
1990 – 2000.
  
269 Capability is based on two indicators: HDI and GDP per 
capita.270 Potential to mitigate is related to two factors: the carbon intensity 
of the country’s economy and the emissions per capita of the country.271
The six categories proposed by the EIG model are as follows:
 
272
Annex II: this category contains the same countries as Annex II 
of the UNFCCC. The countries in this category have binding 
commitments to undertake ‘quantified’ absolute emissions 
reductions.
 
273 These would be more demanding than the Kyoto 
commitments.274
                                                          
268 Ibid 
 In addition, they would have to provide funds 
and technology to countries in the different developing country 
269 Winkler et al (note 216) at 475. The authors use the cumulative emissions from 1990 as an indicator for 
historical responsibility. 1990 is used because it is assumed that by 1990 the implications of fossil fuel use were 
well known internationally, and so countries could be expected to take responsibility for their actions after 
that date. Taking into account emissions before 1990 would be punishing countries for activities whose 
consequences they were not aware of. 
270 Ibid. The authors state that this criterion is used because a country’s capacity to reduce GHG emissions may 
be different from its responsibility. Therefore, a country may have high historical emissions but be quite poor, 
therefore not having the capability to reduce its emissions. Conversely, a country with a high national income 
would be expected to carry a higher mitigation burden. 
271 Ibid. Countries with high carbon intensities would be assumed to have a high potential to mitigate and high 
per capita emissions would signal unsustainable consumption patterns which could be altered without 
endangering basic lifestyle factors. 
272 Ott et al (note 216); Winkler et al (note 216) 
273 Ott et al (note 216); Winkler et al (note 216); Baer and Athanasiou (note 231) 












categories to undertake their own emissions reductions and 
limitations.275
Economies in transition (EIT): this category is constituted of 
those countries included Annex I but not Annex II, of the 
UNFCCC. These are mainly those countries making the 
transition to a market based economy. Countries in this 
category would also have to undertake quantified emissions 
reduction commitments, but would have low or no obligations to 
provide funding to developing countries.
  
276
Newly industrialised countries (NICs): this is the group of 
developing countries that have reached a high level of 
development as evidenced by elevated levels of wealth and other 
HDI indicators. The countries in this category would have to 
undertake quantified absolute emissions reduction or limitation 
commitments, if they are provided with finance and technology 
from Annex II countries.
 
277 Otherwise, they would only 
undertake qualitative emissions limitations. These countries 
would be obligated to implement sustainable development 
policies and undertake renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets (these would be self-funded). Countries in this group 
include Bahrain, South Korea, Kuwait and Trinidad and 
Tobago.278
Rapidly industrialising developing countries (RIDCs): this 
category includes countries that have had relatively rapid 
industrial growth and relatively high income. The countries in 
this category would have to undertake absolute emissions 
  
                                                          
275 Ibid 
276 Ibid 
277 This finance would be used to fund the incremental costs of meeting the NICs mitigation commitments. 












limitation commitments, provided they receive finance and 
technology from Annex II countries.279 If finance is not received 
they would only be committed to qualitative targets. The 
countries in the category are also required to implement 
sustainable development policies and undertake renewable 
energy and energy efficiency targets (these would be co-funded 
by countries in Annex II). Countries in this category would 
include Brazil, China, Cyprus, Mexico, South Africa and 
Botswana.280
Other developing countries (ODCs): these are the countries 
which are neither NICs, RIDCs nor least developed countries. 
The countries in this category would only be required to 
implement sustainable development policies and undertake 
renewable energy and energy efficiency targets (these would be 
co-funded by countries in Annex II). Countries in the category 




Least developed countries (LDCs): these are the countries that 
are designated as LDCs by the UN. These countries would not 
have any emissions reduction or limitation commitments. They 
could implement sustainable development policies and 
undertake renewable energy and energy efficiency targets (these 
would be optional and would be co-funded by countries in 
Annex II). Countries in this group would include Mozambique, 
Lesotho, Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar.
 
282
                                                          
279 This finance would be used to fund the full costs of meeting the RIDCs mitigation commitments. 
 














The model stipulates that NICs and RIDCs would only undertake binding 
and quantifiable commitments to reduce or limit their emissions two 
conditions or triggers are met. Firstly developed countries would be required 
to take deep emissions cuts and secondly Annex II countries would provide 
them with finance and technology.283 The graduation of developing countries 
from one category to another would occur when their RCP indicators are 
reflective of the group immediately higher than their own.284
There are two criticisms that may be levelled against the EIG model 
although it can be considered a fair and equitable model that complies very 
strongly with the elements of the CDR principle. Firstly, if the criteria used 
in the model are not carefully adjusted, some poorer developing countries 
could be included under the group of NICs or RIDCs.
 The categories 
would be reviewed and modified after each commitment period, which are 
proposed to be five years. 
285 Examples include 
Kazakhstan and Suriname. Secondly, the model is quite complex and 
involves many graduation events which could prove to be controversial 
amongst developing countries.286
3.3.4 Greenhouse development rights framework 
 Developing countries which do not have 
the institutional capacity to examine the different criteria and their 
implications would not be able to negotiate themselves into a suitable 
category. 
The Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) model is a reference 
framework that proposes an entirely different architecture for the climate 
regime.287
                                                          
283 Ott et al (note 216); Winkler et al (note 216); Honkonen (note 78)  
 This would be an evolution of the UNFCCC that would require 
284 Winkler et al (note 216) at  
285 Baer and Athanasiou (note 231) at 11 
286 Ibid 












drastic restructuring of the treaty. The GDR framework does not include any 
annexes but favours continuous differentiation as its preferred model.288
The GDR framework is premised on the right to sustainable development 
from which a global emissions reduction ‘effort-sharing system’ is derived. 
This right to development is defined as human development that leads to the 
satisfaction of fundamental needs such that people are freed from 
vulnerability and deprivation.
  
289 The model is based on the assumption that 
if a climate regime does not embrace the right to development then it will be 
doomed to failure.290
As a way of quantifying the right to development, the model proposes a 
development threshold. This threshold is the level at which human beings 
would achieve a modest yet dignified existence characterised by a decent 
level of security and well-being.
 
291 The development threshold is set at 
US$7500 per annum which is deemed to be the level of income where people 
typically meet most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) such as 
universal primary school completion and satisfactory maternal and child 
health.292 Those individuals living below the development threshold should 
be allowed to focus on meeting the daily demands of life while those above 
the threshold must contribute to mitigation of, and adaptation to climate 
change.293
                                                          
288 Ibid. The framework proposes several new and innovative features such as the consideration of inter-
national and intra-national equity and the introduction of a development threshold. Most of the proposals 
contained in the framework are not in line with the current political realities and authors themselves accept 
that the framework represents an ideal climate change regime. Baer et al (note 42) at 30 
 It is worth pausing here to note that the GDR recognises a global 
class of the poor, and a global class of the rich. Therefore while there are 
289 This is contrasted with the wasteful consumptive practices of the populations of most industrialised 
nations. Baer et al (note 42) at 39 
290 Ibid 
291 Baer et al (note 42) at 41 
292 Ibid at 42 












poor countries and rich countries, there will be a wealthy class in the poor 
countries and a poor class within the rich countries. The right to 
development and the development threshold apply to the global poor.294
The GDR framework uses the responsibility-capacity index (RCI) to 
arrive at global emissions reduction allocations. Responsibility is comprised 
of the historical contribution to global warming excluding those emissions 
necessary for meeting basic human needs.
 
295 This criterion counts 
cumulative carbon-dioxide emissions since 1990 and the model makes the 
assumption that emissions are proportional to consumption which in turn is 
proportional to income.296 This means that responsibility is higher in 
wealthy countries while poor countries are largely free of responsibility.297
Capacity is made up of the ability to pay for mitigation and adaptation 
without sacrificing basic human necessities.
  
298 The model assumes that 
capacity is strongly correlated to wealth and is defined as the income of the 
wealthier population that is above the development threshold. Poor 
countries would therefore have little capacity while rich countries would 
have greater capacity and hence greater obligations.299
There are three steps to implementing the GDR framework. First, the 
total global mitigation effort is estimated. This is calculated as the difference 




                                                          
294 Ibid at 43 
C and the business as usual scenario. Second, this global 
mitigation effort is divided into ‘national mitigation obligations’ according to 
the RCI. Third, each country is assigned a national emissions allocation 
295 Ibid at 49 
296 Ibid at 53 
297 Ibid at 54 
298 Ibid 












which is equal to their business as usual scenario less their national 
mitigation obligation.300 Depending on each country’s mitigation obligation 
each country may have an allocation that allows growth over time;301 an 
allocation that requires emissions reduction that could be met domestically; 
or an allocation that requires reductions that are so great that a country 
could only meet them by mitigating domestically as well as in another 
country.302
The GDR framework could also be used as a framework for raising 
finance for funding mitigation and technology transfer in that each country 
would be allocated a share of the global mitigation and adaptation bill 
according to the RCI.
  
303
The GDR framework is a comprehensive proposal for the restructuring of 
the climate change regime. Moreover, it rigorously incorporates the elements 
of the CDR principle. There are however, some weaknesses in the model. 
Firstly, any model that seeks to include the participation of all developing 
countries in emissions reduction allocations will not be politically feasible 
and risks locking vulnerable countries into a framework that they cannot 
afford to implement. If the criteria used in the model are not carefully 
balanced, poorer countries which lack negotiating muscle may be 
disadvantaged by the allocation system. Secondly, the model is quite 
complex including many different policy variables. Developing countries 
which do not have the institutional capacity to examine the different criteria 
and their implications would not be able to negotiate themselves a suitable 
allocation. 
 These funds would go to a global mitigation and 
adaptation fund. 
                                                          
300 Ibid at 68 
301 Or excess allocations that could be sold to other countries 
302 Or by purchasing the unused allocations of other countries 












In conclusion, this chapter has examined whether the CDR principle is 
flexible enough to allow for the progression in the status of developing 
countries. It has been shown that the principle does allow for evolution and 
graduation and that the principle does allow for developing countries that 
have advanced to a certain stage to take on commitments within the climate 
change treaty system. The chapter also provided a brief description and 
analysis of four of the most prominent evolution and graduation models. 
The next chapter will propose key elements that any model of evolution 
and graduation should include in order to meet the need for urgent action 

















4 Chapter 4 – Equitable evolution and graduation 
Having established that the CDR principle does allow for the evolution of 
the climate treaty system to include the participation of developing countries 
in emissions reduction commitments, it is important to outline how this 
could be done in line with the key elements of the CDR principle. 
This chapter proposes the key elements for an appropriate model for 
evolution and graduation. It begins with a discussion of the principles that 
should be incorporated by any evolution and graduation model and then 
goes on to discuss the conditions under which evolution and graduation 
should take place. Next the chapter discusses the architecture that is 
proposed for an appropriate evolution and graduation model before going on 
to discuss tools and mechanisms for operationalising evolution and 
graduation. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the preferred model 
for evolution and graduation. Infused into the discussion on the key 
elements for evolution and graduation is an analysis of the outcomes of the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and how these would impact or be 
impacted on by these key elements. 
4.1 Principles 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the negotiations at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference have reached a standstill. Issues that remain 
contentious are finance, technology, mitigation and the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol. On the issue of mitigation, differences remained on the nature of 
mitigation by developed countries, a collective goal for mitigation (as 
opposed to individual targets), and comparability of efforts (between Kyoto 
Annex B Parties, the US and advanced economies).304
                                                          
304 IISD (note 2) at 16 
 Developed countries 
suggested limiting discussions to those mitigation actions that were 
common to both developed and developing countries (thus including 
developing countries in mitigation commitments). Developing countries on 












emissions reduction commitments that are legally binding and in line with 
the requirements of science.305 Two issues that were especially controversial 
were the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs),306 and the so 
called Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable (MRV)307
Any discussion on evolution and graduation should be firmly rooted in 
the CDR principle. It should therefore clearly reflect the objectives of the 
principle. As discussed in Chapter 2 above, the main objectives of the CDR 
principle are to achieve substantive equity, to assign greater responsibility to 
those States that have contributed more to a particular environmental 
problem; to assign greater responsibility to those States that have greater 
capacity to solve environmental problems; and to achieve better and more 
effective participation in international environmental regimes. 
 issue. Developed 
countries are therefore pushing for the evolution of the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol. 
                                                          
305 Ibid 
306 The controversy revolves around whether developing countries’ voluntary actions should be open for 
international scrutiny (developed country position) or whether only those supported by international action 
should be opened up (developing country position). The Copenhagen Accord, has tried to address this in a 
clumsy wording that states that ‘Mitigation actions ‘... taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their 
domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national 
communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of 
their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis 
under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, 
finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These 
supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting 
and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties....’ UNFCCC Secretariat 
‘Copenhagen Accord’. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf [Accessed: 11 
January 2010] 
307 This has been one of the most contentious issues since the 13TH COP in Bali. There is no clarification as to 
whether MRV relates to mitigation action by developing countries (as argued for by developed countries) or 
whether it relates to finance and technology transfer by developed countries (as advocated by developing 
countries). A weak compromise was reached by the Copenhagen Accord which states ‘... Delivery of reductions 
and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and 
any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets 












Therefore, an appropriate evolution and graduation model should be 
based on the achievement of substantive equity, rather than perpetuating 
the fiction of the sovereign equality of States.308 It should explicitly take into 
consideration the different ability of States to implement their commitments 
and the need for development amongst developing countries.309
Furthermore, the most appropriate model for evolution and graduation 
should assign greater responsibility to those States that have contributed to 
global warming and climate change. As stressed in Chapter 2, most 
industrialised nations owe a debt to the world for decades and in some cases 
centuries, of GHG emissions and this historical responsibility cannot easily 
be written off. As most of the models discussed in Chapter 3 clearly 




In addition a fair and equitable evolution and graduation model should 
assign greater responsibility to those States that have greater capacity to 
effect remedial action. While it is not always the case, this greater capacity 
lies with developed countries who owe the strength of their economies to the 
gains they received through cumulative GHG emissions over the years. 
Amongst developing countries there are also those countries that have a 
higher capacity to mitigate climate change due to their advanced levels of 
development. 
 and so they should be assigned reduced responsibilities 
for solving the problem. 
Finally, an appropriate model for evolution and graduation must be 
framed in such a way that it leads to the achievement of better and more 
effective participation in the climate regime. As stated previously in this 
study, climate change mitigation may, if not framed properly, interfere with 
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309 Baer et al (note 42) 
310 Although at the rate of emissions growth in developing countries, they will contribute to future and 












the ability of developing countries to deliver much needed development to 
their societies. The model should therefore offer inducement to reluctant 
developing countries to take on more stringent emissions reduction 
commitments and alleviate the potential burden on developing countries to 
take on mitigation commitments. 
Placing evolution and graduation within the limits of the CDR principle 
as discussed above is important because despite the urgency required in 
responding to climate change, differential treatment is still valid. For 
example, it is almost unconscionable that developed countries such as the 
US and the EU seek to equate their own action with corresponding action by 
countries like India and China.311
This is not to say that newly and rapidly industrialising countries 
should not take on any emissions reduction commitments. Indeed the 
objectives of the CDR principle enumerated above would require that most 
of the larger developing countries should take on mitigation commitments. 
This is because for the past few decades they have been responsible for more 
than their fair share of global GHG emissions. Moreover, those developing 
countries that have reached a certain level of development can afford to 
reduce their levels of GHG emissions in order to achieve global 
sustainability.  
 It is patently unfair that after failing to 
implement and meet their (very modest) Kyoto Protocol commitments, 
developed countries want to turn around and include developing countries 
on the premise that their contributions are too significant to ignore. 
Therefore, having satisfied ourselves on the principles that should 
underscore any discussion or model on evolution and graduation what then 
are the conditions under which evolution and graduation should be 
implemented?  
                                                          
311 President George W. Bush of the US cited the lack of commitments for India and China as one of the 
reasons he refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. See Stone (note 47). More recently the EU and other 
developed countries at the UNFCCC COP 15 were pushing hard for a ‘comparability of efforts’ for developed 













As discussed in Section 4.1 above and Section 4.2 below, the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference has seen developed countries 
pushing for the total overhaul of the climate regime with strong inclinations 
towards replacing the Kyoto Protocol with one single protocol that includes 
actions for all developed countries (including the US) and major developing 
countries. The author, however, argues that they should be retained and 
adapted to allow for evolution and graduation as argued for in Chapter 3 
above. Developed countries are very vocal in their demands for developed 
countries (with perhaps the exclusion of LDCs) to take on mitigation 
commitments.312 At the same time, developed countries are hesitant to 
commit themselves to deep emissions cuts and even more so to providing 
finance and technology to developing countries.313 With regards to finance, 
controversy remains on the administration and governance of new finance 
measures, the origin of funds and their disbursement.314
There are certain conditions that must be met before developing 
countries can take part in any emissions reduction commitments. Winkler et 




Before developing countries can begin participating in an emissions 
reduction commitment regime, developed countries must take, and continue 
taking the lead. Article 3 of the UNFCCC clearly states that in line with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities, developed country Parties should 
 These triggers include actions for both 
developed and developing countries.  
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‘take the lead in combating climate change’ and its adverse impacts. This 
exhortation is still valid for three reasons:316
• Developed countries still bear the historical responsibility for 
climate change. They are responsible current global warming 
and climate change 
 
• Developed countries have more ‘luxury’ emissions and any 
action they take to mitigate climate change is not likely to 
impact on meeting the basic human needs of their populations 
• Developed countries have more financial and technological 
capacity to remedy the causes and effects of climate change.   
To this end, developed countries should act first in combating climate 
change. They should, as a gesture of global goodwill implement and attempt 
to meet, as far as possible, their Kyoto targets. In addition, developed 
countries should take on deep emissions reduction targets for the post-2012 
period. In doing this, they would be signalling to developing countries, 
(particularly the ones that they are trying to persuade to take on emissions 
reduction commitments) that they are serious about their climate change 
commitments and that they intend to deal honourably with developing 
countries. 
In addition to taking the lead, developed countries should provide 
finance and technological assistance to developing countries to meet their 
emissions reduction commitments.317
                                                          
316 Winkler et al (note 216) at 471 
 These financial and technological 
transfers are important for two reasons.  
317 Which developing countries would be financed and to what extent should be negotiated within the context 
of the UNFCCC, but it is important to note that the UNFCCC Secretariat estimates that an additional US$200 – 
210 billion will be needed for climate change mitigation in 2030 (compared to US$ that has been pledged and 
received by the Financial Mechanism of the Convention to date). See UNFCCC Secretariat ‘Investment and 
financial flows to address climate change’ Available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.pdf 












Firstly, the finance and technology transfers would be globally 
beneficial because infrastructural and policy decisions that lock in high 
emissions would be avoided.318 For example decisions and investments in 
industrial facilities,319 transport, energy provision, homes and offices could 
commit developing countries to infrastructure that will emit high levels of 
GHG for a long time into the future. Conversely, if these developing 
countries are provided with sufficient investments and financial flows these 
investments could go towards environmental friendly instalments.320
Secondly, given that mitigation is likely to be cheaper in developing 
countries, the finance and technology flows to developing countries would 
assist developed countries meet their own mitigation targets more affordably 
than in their own countries. 
 
While advocating for the participation of newly and rapidly 
industrialising developing countries in emissions reduction regimes, it 
should be stressed that this participation should be entirely voluntary. 
Developing countries should not be coerced into taking on emissions 
reduction commitments and moreover, graduation should not be 
automatic.321 As Winkler and Voster note, developing countries are not likely 
to surrender their sovereignty to external factors, particularly in such a 
controversial area as climate change. Evolution and graduation should be 
based on the self-election of developing countries.322
In order to encourage developing countries to take on binding 
emissions reduction commitments, strong incentives and disincentives 
 
                                                          
318 Winkler et al (note 216) at 471 
319 A perfect South Africa example is the Coega Industrial Development Zone which could commit South Africa 
to several decades of high GHG emissions with developments such as aluminium smelters.  
320 Winkler et al (note 216) at 471 
321 Rajamani (note 31) at 51; Harald Winkler and Shaun Vorster ‘Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road 
from Bali’ (2007) 7 Climate Policy 240 at 246 












should be put in place. For example, a strong financial mechanism such as 
in the Montreal Protocol (as described in section 2.8.1 above) could be 
implemented. Also, side-payments or preferential treatment in other fora 
such as the WTO could be used to persuade developing countries to accept 
mitigation commitments. Disincentives such as economic sanctions could 
ensure that these countries abide by their voluntary commitments. 
It is important to stress that any evolution and graduation model 
should protect the interests of developing countries. This is true also for 
whichever architecture is chosen for evolution and graduation models. 
4.3 Architecture, tools and mechanisms 
One of the most controversial the issues at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference was the future of the Kyoto Protocol, most developed 
countries argued for the development of a new Protocol that would include 
mitigation commitments for all countries including the USA and developing 
countries. For example Australia emphasized its preference for a ‘unified 
Protocol’ and the EU and Japan stated that although they would commit to 
safeguarding the key elements of the Kyoto Protocol, it was important to 
broaden its scope in an expanded and more durable vehicle than the Kyoto 
Protocol.323 The developed countries are therefore advocating for the 
evolution of the climate regime though a comprehensive review of the 
architecture of the regime. Developing countries are understandably wary of 
this. Most developing countries supported the development of a new Protocol 
for the US and advanced developing countries and amendments for the 
Kyoto Protocol. They fear a situation where developed countries will 
abandon the Kyoto Protocol and their commitments along with it while 
requiring comparable efforts by developing countries.324
                                                          















In designing the most appropriate climate regime that includes 
developing country mitigation commitments, preference should be given to 
gradual or incremental evolution over comprehensive or drastic structural 
changes. In particular, models that require the participation of all 
developing countries from the outset cannot be considered equitable and 
would be contrary to the CDR principle. They would not, for example, take 
into consideration the historical responsibility of developed countries and 
would likely place the needs of developing countries in jeopardy. To this end, 
the EIG model discussed in Chapter 3 remains the most favoured. In fact, 
the writer concurs with Axel Michaelowa who states that the architecture of 
the Kyoto Protocol is still valid.325
An appropriate evolution and graduation model would allow for a mix of 
different types of commitments. Quantified emissions reduction and 
limitation obligations (QUELROs) would be most appropriate for developed 
countries, while developing countries should be allowed to choose between 
QUELROs and NAMAs as suits their needs.
 
326
Finally, the evolution and graduation model should use a mixture of 
binding and non-binding commitments for developing countries. 
   
4.4 Favoured Model 
Of the models discussed in Chapter 3, the Equity in the Greenhouse 
(EIG) is the closest to fulfilling the principles, conditions and architecture 
advocated by this study. The writer agrees with the authors of that study 
that the division between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties is still useful only 
if it serves as the first level of differentiation. The six categories proposed 
there, namely Annex II, EIT, NIC, RIDC, ODC and LDC are considered 
appropriate for this study. Specifically it is proposed that: 
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Annex II should take on binding mitigation commitments and should 
provide funds and technology to countries in the different developing 
country categories to undertake their own emissions reductions and 
limitations. 
EITs should undertake quantified emissions reduction commitments, 
but have low or no obligations to provide funding to developing countries. 
NICs should take on quantified absolute emissions reduction 
commitments, condition on finance and technology from Annex II countries, 
failing which, they should only undertake qualitative emissions limitations. 
RIDCs should take on absolute emissions limitation commitments, 
provided they receive finance and technology from Annex II countries. If it is 
not forthcoming, they should only be committed to qualitative limitations 
targets.  
ODCs should only be required to implement sustainable development 
policies and programmes that would move them onto more sustainable 
pathways. 
LDCs should not have any emissions reduction or limitation 
commitments.  
All classes of developing countries should only take on emissions 
reduction commitments if developed countries take on deep emissions 
reduction commitments. In order to ensure that the model is implemented 
in a fair and equitable manner, the criteria used should be carefully 
balanced and more weight placed on the social indicators such as the HDI. 
Furthermore, as stated in Section 4.2 above, the graduation of developing 
countries from one stage to another should be voluntary and based on 
financial and other incentives. 
The two new categories of NIC and RIDC could be included in the 
























5 Chapter 5 – Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 Summary 
The climate change negotiations have reached crisis point and there 
does not seem to be a way out. Many of the country positions remained 
entrenched throughout the whole two-year process with high levels of 
mistrust between developed and developing countries. Much of the 
controversy between developed and developing countries can be traced to 
one of the founding principles of the UNFCCC namely the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CDR). This principle is 
implemented in several ways throughout the Convention. For example, while 
the Convention encourages developed countries to stabilise GHG emissions 
and, the Kyoto Protocol commits them to binding emissions reduction 
targets, there are no such commitments for developing countries.  
The stalemate in the negotiations relates to emissions reduction 
commitments for the period after 2012 when the current commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol will expire. Developed countries, with the bulk of 
the responsibility for climate change, are demanding that large developing 
countries should take on emissions reduction commitments. The basis of 
their argument is that the developing country emissions continue to grow 
and will soon outpace those of developed countries. Developing countries on 
the other hand argue that emissions reduction commitments would 
jeopardise their developmental programmes and that developed countries 
have the historical responsibility for climate change and so should act 
unilaterally to combat it.  Negotiations under the AWG-KP made little 
progress during 2009.   
There is a deep divide between developed and developing countries 
with both sides using the CDR principle to justify their positions. Developed 
countries claim that the principle requires that all countries take on 
emissions reduction commitments although these may differ according to 












them to transfer finance or technology to developing countries. Developing 
countries, on the other hand, claim that the principle absolves them totally 
from any emissions reduction commitments.  
The purpose of this study was to examine the CDR principle and 
ascertain whether it absolves developing countries from taking on emissions 
reduction commitments. It also aimed to determine whether evolution and 
graduation are constituents of the CDR principle and if so, how they could 
be implemented in a manner that is both fair and equitable. Finally the 
study aimed to propose key elements of an evolution and graduation model 
that could be deemed fair and equitable.  
The study began by tracing the history of the CDR principle. It showed 
that the differential treatment, which provides the foundation for the 
principle, can be traced from three separate but related developments in 
international law. These are differentiation in treaty law, differentiation in 
trade and economic development and differential treatment in 
environmental law subsequent to the Stockholm Conference in 1972.  
The study analysed the rationale for the existence of the CDR 
principle. It showed that based on the literature there are four objectives for 
the principle. These are to achieve of substantive equality; to assign greater 
responsibility to those countries with higher responsibility for the creation of 
a problem; to assign responsibility for those countries with greater capacity 
to solve an environmental problem; and to achieve better and more effective 
participation in an environmental treaty. 
The legal status of the CDR principle was examined and the study 
showed that although scholars are agreed that the principle is not binding, 
this may not be significant as it has achieved the status of an influential soft 
law principle. The study went on to examine the scope and content of the 
principle and showed that it is made up of three elements. The first is the 











second is the element of differentiated responsibility and the last is the 
element of leadership by developed countries.  
The study also investigated the different forms of differentiation. It 
showed that there are three main forms of differentiation. These are 
unconditional treatment where the treaty or agreement does not provide for 
or allow for differential treatment but may unwittingly permit this through 
the use of reservations or interpretive statements. The second is contextual 
differentiation where a treaty or agreement does not on the face of it provide 
for differential treatment but allows or encourages differentiation in 
implementation. The third is concrete differentiation where the treaty or 
agreement explicitly makes provision for different terms and 
implementation. 
It was shown that that differentiation can be implemented using 
different tools and methods including grace periods, consideration of the 
special needs of developing countries and the use of different categories. The 
study briefly scrutinised the weaknesses of the CDR principle and found 
that in addition to its unclear legal status and the disputes over its scope 
and content, other weaknesses include lack of clarity over whether the 
principle is designed to evolve over time with the changes in the 
circumstances of Parties. It was shown that these flaws are not fatal and 
that there is still room for the principle in international environmental law. 
The study went on to describe how the CDR principle has been 
implemented in two different treaties. The Montreal Protocol was adopted 
prior to the enunciation of the principle at Rio in 1992 and yet it is a very 
good example of the implementation of differential treatment. It implements 
differentiation mainly through the use of contextual differentiation for 
example it allows for financial and technological assistance for developing 
countries and gives them delayed implementation schedules. The UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol on the other hand implement the CDR principle 
mainly through the explicit mention of the principle, through contextual 












A central question of the study was whether the principle was intended 
to evolve and whether it was flexible enough to allow advanced developing 
countries to take on mitigation commitments. The study showed that there 
is nothing in the phrasing of Principle 7 or Article 3 of the UNFCCC, which 
are alternative wordings of the CDR principle, that suggest either implicitly 
or explicitly that the principle is inflexible or that it exempts developing 
countries from taking on mitigation commitments. 
The study therefore suggests that there is room in the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol for mechanisms that would enable evolution of the treaties 
and graduation of some advanced developing countries. The study went on 
to discuss four of the most prominent models that have been proposed for 
the evolution of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These models are the 
contraction and convergence model, the multi-stage approach, the equity in 
the greenhouse model, and the greenhouse development rights framework. 
Having shown that the CDR principle allows for evolution and 
graduation, the study went on to discuss the key elements that any model 
on evolution and graduation that claims to be fair and equitable should 
possess. The first key element is a group of principles that should form the 
basis of any such model. These principles are based on the rationale for the 
CDR principle and are: the achievement of substantive equity, the 
assignment of greater responsibility for contribution to climate change, 
assignment of greater responsibility for higher capacity to solve the climate 
change problem and the achievement of better and more effective 
participation in the climate regime.  
The study then discussed the conditions under which evolution and 
graduation must occur if they are to be deemed fair and equitable. The 
study argues that developed countries must act first, work towards meeting 
their Kyoto targets, take on deep emissions cuts in the next commitment 
period and provide funds to developing countries to assist them to meet 












voluntary. The study favours the gradual evolution of the climate regime 
over drastic or comprehensive changes.  
The study then discussed the favoured model for evolution and 
graduation. This was found to be the equity in the greenhouse model which 
was preferred because it takes into account all of the CDR principles. If the 
weaknesses of the model are managed, it could provide an equitable 
framework for evolution and graduation in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The objectives of the study were: to analyse the CDR and develop an 
understanding of its operation; to determine whether the use of the principle 
in the climate regime releases developing countries from taking on 
mitigation commitments; to analyse whether the CDR principle 
encompasses the notions of evolution and graduation; and to investigate 
what forms of evolution and graduation would be fair and equitable. 
These objectives have been met. Chapter 2 dealt extensively with the 
CDR principle while Chapter 3 showed that the CDR principle is flexible and 
will allow developing countries to take on mitigation commitments and that 
it encompasses the notions of evolution and graduation. Finally Chapter 4 
outlined the key elements on which evolution and graduation should be 
based. 
Furthermore the study has contributed to a better understanding of the 
CDR principle and its operation; a better understanding of the concepts of 
evolution and graduation; a better understanding of the relationship 
between CDR and the concepts of evolution and graduation; and the 
development of key elements that any models of evolution and graduation 














The earth’s climate system is close to reaching a point where 
catastrophic change is inevitable. At this crucial time, climate negotiations 
are moving at a snail’s pace with both developed and developing countries 
digging their heels in regarding their emissions reduction commitments for 
the future; commitments that could either restore the climate system or 
allows runaway climate change. The main obstacle to the former situation 
seems to be one of the foundational principles of the climate change treaty 
system: the CDR principle. One way of bridging this chasm is to implement 
the concepts of evolution of the climate treaty system and graduation of 
advanced developing countries. 
The study therefore recommends that:  
1. It is time to move on from the simple developed/ developing 
country divide in multilateral environmental agreements, 
particularly in the climate change regime 
2. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol should be retained  but  
should include mechanisms that would enable evolution and 
graduation 
3. The EIG model is the most suitable in terms of the CDR principle  
Further areas of research could be on:  
1. The interface of the CDR principle with the Copenhagen Accord and 
other outcomes of the current negotiation process,  
2. A deeper understanding of evolution and graduation within the 
climate change treaty system – particularly in view of the fact that the 
future of the Kyoto Protocol is not certain. The successor of the 
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